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ABSTRACT 
The Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) is widely used by the nation’s 
hospitals, yet there is a paucity of research and a lack of developed models to 
examine HICS implementation. A study of HICS implementation may benefit 
hospitals, provide insight for future revisions, and add to the body of knowledge 
about HICS. This case study examined the critical factors that lead to the 
successful implementation of HICS based upon Stanford Medicine’s response to 
the Asiana plane crash of July 6, 2013. Four commonalities identified from the 
literature review formed a hypothesis for successful HICS implementation that 
was tested and supported. In addition to the lessons learned that supported the 
tested hypothesis, the documentation reviewed described highly competent 
individuals and cohesive teamwork. It was not possible to separate individual and 
team competence from the tested hypothesis. As a result of this study, six critical 
factors were identified from the supported hypothesis that form an HICS 
Implementation Model for future evaluation.  
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The Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) is a system of incident 
management that applies the principles of the Incident Command System (ICS) 
to hospitals. ICS is an organizational and multi-organizational management 
system developed in the 1970s by California’s FIRESCOPE (Firefighting 
Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies), a working 
partnership of fire service partners at the local, regional, state and federal level. 
Both HICS and ICS provide a scalable, flexible organizational structure that 
allows for common terminology and span of control during incident response and 
may expand or contract depending on the size of the incident. 
Many of the 6,000 hospitals in the United States use a version of HICS for 
emergency management, and international use continues to increase. HICS is 
also used by all Navy hospitals. The Orange County Emergency Medical 
Services Agency developed HICS in 1991 in partnership with the California 
Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA), and EMSA released subsequent 
versions, each with increasing stakeholder input. The Fifth Edition was released 
in 2014. 
This thesis is a case study in the identification of critical factors leading to 
the successful implementation of HICS by Stanford Medicine in response to the 
Asiana plane crash of July 6, 2013, hereafter referred to as Asiana.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
HICS is widely used, yet there is a paucity of research on HICS 
implementation. No model exists for evaluating HICS implementation or using it 
as a predictor of success. A study of HICS may benefit hospitals, provide input 
for future revisions, and add to the body of knowledge about HICS. 
 xvi 
The impact of HICS, positive or negative, has not been comprehensively 
studied, and implementation of the system seems to be limited to anecdotal 
examples. Before the hospital response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings 
provided anecdotal support for the value of HICS, the most compelling 
documentation available on the value and use of HICS in the United States was 
a survey conducted at Northridge Hospital after the Northridge Earthquake of 
1994. 
A research endeavor of HICS implementation during an emergency 
response appears timely, if not overdue. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION  
What are the critical factors that lead to the successful implementation of 
HICS based upon Stanford Medicine’s response to Asiana? For the purposes of 
this case study, Stanford Medicine refers to Stanford Hospital, Lucile Packard 
Children’s Hospital, and the Stanford University School of Medicine located in 
Palo Alto, California. 
D.  ANALYSIS 
Although the available literature on HICS implementation was not 
extensive, four commonalities that support the perceived successful 
implementation of HICS were identified to build a model for successful 
implementation.  
 The literature supports that a firm commitment of hospital executive 
leadership to implement HICS within a culture of preparedness is a 
critical factor in successful HICS implementation. 
 It appeared that advance planning with community partners that 
includes training, drills, and exercising are critical variables in 
successful HICS implementation. 
 An effective communication plan with redundancies for information 
management to both internal and external partners is another factor 
identified from the literature review that supports successful HICS 
implementation. 
 xvii 
 The modification of HICS to the individual hospital’s or health 
system’s needs appeared to be a critical factor as part of the 
planning process.  
The HICS implementation model proposes that if a hospital implements 
HICS and embraces the four commonalities, the hospital will then perceive HICS 
to be successful during an actual incident. Perceived success is measured by 
staff statements indicating such, e.g., “HICS worked.”  
A comprehensive review and analysis of all documentation relative to 
Stanford’s Emergency Management Program was conducted including an 
analysis of HICS activations, an average of 29.6 annually, for the five years that 
preceded Asiana. It was determined that the four commonalities identified for 
successful HICS implementation are demonstrated at Stanford Medicine. Thus, it 
was reasonable to hypothesize that Stanford personnel would perceive HICS 
implementation to be successful in response to Asiana. 
A review of extensive after action documentation was conducted to test 
this hypothesis. In addition to the after action report (AAR), all HICS materials 
and forms relevant to Asiana were reviewed along with debrief data collection 
forms and debrief emails. The AAR stated, “The established HICS processes and 
procedures worked” specifically under the category of communication. It was 
reasonable to conclude that the tested hypothesis was supported. 
In addition to the lessons learned that support the tested hypothesis, the 
documentation reviewed described highly competent individuals and cohesive 
teamwork. It was not possible to separate individual and team competence from 
the tested hypothesis. 
Through the analysis conducted at Stanford, it appeared the four 
commonalities may not be granular enough for future evaluations and may be 




E.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of analyzing the data from Stanford, it is recommended that the 
four commonalilties or critical factors for further hypothesis testing be subdivided 
in six areas for further evaluation. This delineation will provide greater specificity 
for future analysis: 
 Executive and Administrative Support 
 Planning and Tailoring (includes modifying HICS) 
 Training and Retraining 
 HICS Activations and Exercises 
 Communication 
 Coordination with Community/External Partners 
These six critical factors comprise a HICS Implementation Model that is 
provided as an appendix that may be used as an “after action” evaluation tool or 
as a potential predictor of HICS success prior to an incident.  
Recommendations are provided for users of HICS, for future revisions of 
HICS and for future research. Based upon lessons learned from Stanford, the 
HICS Implementation Model comprised of the six critical factors for successful 
HICS implementation is recommended for hospital use, for inclusion in the next 
edition of HICS, and to be collected to further analyze case studies of HICS 
implementation and the perceived success of HICS during an actual event.  
F.  CONCLUSION 
This case study identified critical factors leading to the successful 
implementation of HICS based upon Stanford Medicine’s response to Asiana. A 
hypothesis for successful HICS implementation was developed from a literature 
review and this hypothesis was tested and supported by Stanford. In addition to 
the lessons learned that support the tested hypothesis, the documentation 
reviewed described highly competent individuals and cohesive teamwork. It was 
not possible to separate individual and team competence from the tested 
hypothesis. 
 xix 
A HICS Implementation Model was developed that may be used for “after 
action” evaluations, as a predictor of successful HICS implementation, for 
inclusion in the next version of HICS, and to analyze future case studies of HICS 
implementation.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the critical factors that lead to the successful implementation of 
the Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) based upon Stanford Medicine’s 
response to the Asiana plane crash of July 6, 2013? (hereafter referred to as 
Asiana). For the purposes of this case study, Stanford Medicine refers to 
Stanford Hospital, Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, and the Stanford 
University School of Medicine located in Palo Alto, California. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
What is HICS? Why is it important to study it? Many of the 6,000 hospitals 
in the United States (U.S.) use a version of HICS for emergency planning and 
response according to the American Hospital Association.1 HICS is a system of 
incident management that applies the principles of the Incident Command 
System (ICS) to hospitals. ICS is an organizational and multi-organizational 
management system developed in the 1970s by California’s FIRESCOPE 
(Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies), a 
working partnership of fire service partners at the local, regional, state, and 
federal level. ICS provides a scalable, flexible organizational structure that allows 
for common terminology and span of control during incident response and may 
expand or contract depending on the size of the incident.2 Although FIRESCOPE 
originally designed ICS for the purpose of fighting wildland fires, an entity can 
apply ICS characteristics or principles to any type of situation, emergency or non-
emergency that requires organization.3 The United States Department of 
                                            
1 Rosylne Schulman (American Hospital Association), email correspondence with the author, 
May 14, 2015. 
2 “Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies,” accessed June 
13, 2014, http://www.firescope.org/.  
3 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS) Guidebook (Sacramento CA: California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 2006), ix. 
 2 
Homeland Security (DHS) adopted ICS as part of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and it now has widespread use.4 
HICS incorporates the general organizational structure and management 
characteristics of ICS. Five components comprise the ICS structure: incident 
command, operations, plans, logistics, and finance/administration.5 ICS 
specifically defines various organizational elements in each of these five general 
components.  
The Orange County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Agency in 
partnership with the California Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) 
developed the first version of HICS in 1991.6 Mr. Paul Russell led the 
development of HICS for Orange County and cited a number of benefits for the 
development of this ICS adaptation for hospitals.7 He noted the success of ICS, 
the need for hospitals to have clear management objectives, and the value of a 
common communication language for hospitals to have with public safety and 
hospital partners among the benefits of developing HICS.8  
Subsequent editions were released by EMSA in 1993 and 1998.9 The 
Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) Guidebook released by the California 
EMSA in 2006 introduced incident planning guides (IPGs) and incident response 
guides (IRGs) for a variety of internal scenarios and those external to hospitals, 
as well as expanded job action sheets (JASs). The Fifth Edition of The Hospital 
                                            
4 FEMA, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_AppendixB.pdf. 
5 Ibid., 53. 
6 The 2011 HICS National Summit October 2011 PowerPoint. HICS was originally the 
“Hospital Emergency Incident Command System” or “HEICS.” California EMSA dropped the “E” 
from HEICS with the Fourth Edition in 2006, as ICS principles need not only apply to 
emergencies. 
7 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, California Innovations in Disaster Medical 
Preparedness, EMSA #391-03 (Sacramento, CA: California Emergency Medical Services 
Authority, 1991), 11. 
8 Ibid. 
9 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, California Innovations in Disaster Medical 
Preparedness. EMSA partnered with the Orange County EMS Agency for the 1993 edition and 
with the San Mateo County EMS Agency for the 1998 version. 
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Incident Command System (HICS) Guidebook was recently released by EMSA 
on May 30, 2014.10 HICS has also been adopted internationally. 
For the Fourth and Fifth Editions, California EMSA recruited a 20 member 
National Work Group from hospitals and health systems of different sizes from 
around the United States that provided input into the HICS materials that 
included representatives from the Navy Medicine Office of Homeland Security 
and the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Veterans’ Health Administration 
(the VA). In addition, an Ex Officio group comprised of leaders from the American 
Hospital Association, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security-NIMS 
Integration Center,11 The Joint Commission, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, and the Health Resources and Services Administration advised 
EMSA and the National Work Group. The Contract Support Team was from 
Kaiser Permanente and Med Star Washington Hospital Center. Additionally, a 60 
member Secondary Review Group reviewed the draft HICS materials and 
provided feedback before the final release.  
The numbers and types of subject matter experts are described to 
demonstrate the wide participation in the development of HICS for the incident 
management needs of all hospitals to be represented including Department of 
Defense hospitals and VA hospitals. Navy hospitals12 and VA hospitals also 
implement HICS.13  
HICS is widely used, yet research on HICS implementation is lacking. No 
model exists for evaluating HICS implementation or using it as a predictor of 
                                            
10 “Hospital Incident Command System—Welcome!,” accessed May 30, 2014, http://www. 
emsa.ca.gov/disaster_medical_services_division_hospital_incident_command_system_resources; 
California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) 
Guidebook, Fifth Edition (Rancho Cordova, CA: California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 
2014). 
11 It is now named the National Integration Center. 
12 Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, BUMED Instruction 3440.10 Section 3 Command and 
Control (Falls Church, VA: Department of the Navy, 2008), paragraph 3.a, 33. California EMSA 
credits CMDR Spencer Schoen for the implementation of HICS in Navy hospitals. 
13 The researcher is aware of this implementation from her day-to-day duties. California 
EMSA credits Mr. Peter Brewster for the implementation of HICS in VA hospitals. 
 4 
success. A study of HICS may benefit hospitals, as well as provide input for 
future revisions. 
The impact of HICS, positive or negative, has not been comprehensively 
studied, and implementation of the system seems to be limited to anecdotal 
examples. Before the hospital response to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings 
provided anecdotal support for the value of HICS, the most compelling 
documentation available on the value and use of HICS in the United States was 
a survey conducted at Northridge Hospital after the Northridge earthquake of 
1994.14  
1. The HICS Guidebook  
A description of The HICS Guidebook including HICS forms is provided to 
present a background on the foundational elements of HICS prior to the literature 
review. 
The Fourth Edition of HICS used for the Asiana response is comprised of 
The Hospital Incident Command System Guidebook that contains six chapters 
with learning objectives, a glossary, 11 appendices, and education materials 
designed to assist with the training of the HICS materials.15 
The guidebook explains the critical components of the ICS principles and 
depicts how they are adapted for hospitals. It is not intended to be the final word 
on hospital emergency preparedness or to suffice as a hospital’s emergency 
operations plan (EOP) although it may be of assistance in developing the EOP in 
concert with a hospital’s hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA) and may serve as a 
guide in developing a hospital’s emergency management program (EMP).16 
Chapter IV is devoted exclusively to EMP development. 
                                            
14 Diane Lowder, “The Day the Earth Moved,” Hospitals & Health Networks 69, no. 7 (April 5, 
1995): 32–3. 
15 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS) Guidebook, Fourth Edition. 
16 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS) Guidebook, Fourth Edition, xi. 
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The appendices include incident planning considerations, the HICS 
hospital incident management team (HIMT) chart or organization chart17 (See 
Appendix B of the HIMT) and 78 JASs for the various potential HICS positions. 
As with ICS, HICS is scalable and flexible, and only the positions necessary to 
meet the incident objectives are intended to be activated. 
2. Job Action Sheets 
The JASs list suggested steps or task analyses for each potential position 
broken out into operational periods, i.e., the following. 
 Immediate: 1–2 hours 
 Intermediate: 2–12 hours 
 Extended: beyond 12 hours 
 Demobilization/System Recovery18  
Documents and tools are also listed on each JAS including the applicable 
HICS forms that coincide with the action steps listed. 
See Appendix C of a JAS example for incident commander (IC) and 
Appendix F for potential candidates for HICS positions, which is an 
organizational chart showing which hospital roles can fill command and general 
staff positions. 
In addition, the Fourth Edition of HICS introduced IPGs and IRGs for 13 
internal scenarios and 14 external scenarios. These IPGs and IRGs were 
designed to assist with hospital planning efforts with specific guidance for the 
identified scenarios but also with the plan that they be adapted in accordance 
with a hospital’s HVA for additional scenarios. The internal scenarios were 
                                            
17 Technically, it was called the Incident Management Team or IMT for the Fourth Edition 
and was renamed as the Hospital Incident Management Team or HIMT for the Fifth Edition to 
avoid confusion with government-typed IMTs. The HIMT from the Fifth Edition is the example 
used and is comparable to that of the Fourth Edition. 
18 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS) Guidebook, Fourth Edition, Appendix C, 109. 
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identified by EMSA, the Contract Team and the National Work Group and the 
external scenarios were developed by the DHS.19  
Internal scenarios range from bomb threats to child abductions to work 
stoppage, and external scenarios vary from biological attacks to cyber-attacks to 
natural disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes. 
The IPGs and IRGs differ from the JASs in that they provide general 
planning and response considerations rather than step-by-step actions taken by 
specific positions and they also provide a suggested HIMT organizational chart. 
Since the basic foundational information about HICS has now been 
provided, the literature review provides anecdotes of HICS implementation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review presents sources that describe anecdotal examples 
of the use of HICS, and based on the anecdotes, four identified commonalities 
are presented related to the perceived successful implementation of HICS. 
These anecdotes are taken from journal articles, on-line articles, and from the 
“Summit Proceedings of the 2011 HICS National Summit.”20  
During his presentation on a literature review of HICS during the 2011 
HICS National Summit, Mr. Craig DeAtley, PA-C, of MedStar Washington 
Hospital Center, stated very few articles even mention HICS, and among the few 
articles, no peer reviewed scientific articles could be found.21 Additional material 
about HICS has been written since 2011.  
                                            
19 California Emergency Medical Services Authority, Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS) Guidebook, Fourth Edition, 471. 
20 “The California Emergency Medical Services Authority’s HICS National Summit October 
2011 Summit Proceedings,” Sacramento, CA, October 2011. This national stakeholder summit 
was convened by California EMSA in partnership with the VA. 
21 Ibid., 2. 
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1. Anecdotal Examples of the Use of HICS 
The following are sources of anecdotal information discussed in 
chronological order from which commonalities were identified. The value of HICS 
was noted when it was perceived to be successful. The perceived success of 
HICS is measured by statements of hospital personnel indicating such, e.g., 
“HICS worked.” Examples of HICS implementation range from the 1994 
Northridge Earthquake to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Articles citing the 
use of ICS are also noted after the HICS literature. 
An on-line article in CNN Money entitled “Leading through a Disaster” 
stated that every hospital in Boston implemented HICS on the ill-fated day of 
April 15, 2013, when two bombs went off within seconds of each other near the 
finish line of the Boston Marathon injuring 264 people and killing three.22 
According to Dr. Eric Goralnick, Medical Director of Emergency Preparedness at 
Brigham & Women’s Hospital, “HICS worked.”23 Many reasons for the adoption 
of HICS at this hospital were cited in this article.  
HICS training was cited as valuable in a May 2013 on-line hospital 
newsletter article about the Boston bombings entitled “Training Made the 
Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon Tragedy.”24 Dr. Alasdair Conn, 
Chief of Emergency Services at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH), also 
cited other reasons for the success of HICS.25  
Two articles from Iran describe this country’s official adoption of HICS in 
2007. A 2012 article entitled “Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) 
                                            
22 Eric Goralnick and Ron M. Walls, “Leading through a Disaster,” CNN Money, October 18, 
2013, http://management.fortune.cnn.com/tag/boston-marathon-bombings/. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Robert Tomsho, “Training Made the Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon 




Performance in Iran; Decision Making in Disasters”26 and a 2011 article entitled 
“Are Hospitals Ready to Respond to Disasters? Challenges, Opportunities and 
Strategies of Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS)” 
emphasize the importance of training.27 
“The 2011 HICS National Summit Proceedings” is a report that provides 
anecdotal examples of the success of HICS by the 40 stakeholders in attendance 
at the HICS National Summit in Sacramento, California. These stakeholders 
represented users of HICS from hospitals and health systems from across the 
country, as well as vendors, e.g., HICS trainers and regulators, and e.g., The 
Joint Commission. California EMSA convened the summit in partnership with the 
VA to receive stakeholder input prior to the revision for the Fifth Edition of 
HICS.28  
Mr. Chris Van Gorder, FACHE, President and CEO of SCRIPPS Health in 
San Diego, California, was the summit’s keynote speaker.29 He cited a number of 
examples of successful HICS implementation for responses, such as mass 
casualty incidents, the 2003 and 2007 wildfires, H1N1 and the 2011 
California/Mexico/Arizona power outage, as well as SCRIPPS Health’s response 
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake.30  
The International Journal of Trauma Nursing published an article in 2007 
entitled “Organization of a Hospital-based Victim Decontamination Plan Using the 
                                            
26 Djalali et al., “Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) Performance in Iran; Decision 
Making in Disasters,” Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine, 
20, no. 14 (2012).  
27 Mohammad Yarmohammadian et al., “Are Hospitals Ready to Respond to Disasters? 
Challenges, Opportunities and Strategies of Hospital Emergency Incident Command System 
(HEICS),” Journal of Research in Medical Sciences 16, no. 8 (July 27, 2011): 1070–1077.  
28 “The HICS National Summit Proceedings,” October 2011, produced by Sacramento’s 
State’s Center for Collaborative Policy for the California Emergency Medical Services Authority.  
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Ibid. PowerPoint presentation “HICS in Action” presented by Chris Van Gorder, President 
& CEO, Scripps Health, Immediate Past Chairman, American College of Healthcare Executives. 
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Incident Command Structure,” in which HICS was cited as enhancing the 
effectiveness of hospital-based decontamination.31 
A series of articles entitled “Scarred but Smarter: Lessons Learned from 
Florida’s 2004 Hurricanes” was published by the Florida Hospital Association in 
2004 in Healthcare Executive, which recommended the use of HICS as a lesson 
learned from that year’s hurricane season.32 This same article cites the Yale New 
Haven Health System and touts the advantages of HICS as being critical to 
improving communication and coordination within a hospital and with responding 
agencies, but examples were not provided that illustrated how HICS benefitted 
Florida or the Connecticut system.33  
Law & Health Weekly published an article on a Taiwan hospital’s use of 
HICS entitled “National Cheng Kung University Hospital, Tainan; Hospital 
Emergency Incident Command System Implemented during SARS Outbreak.”34 
HICS was apparently effective in assisting National Cheng Kung University 
Hospital (NCKUH) in Tainan, Taiwan in response to the outbreak of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 as determined by a staff survey.35 A 14-
question survey was conducted by interview of 87% of the 89% of HICS 
leadership positions activated from March 25 to June 16, 2003.36 The authors, 
Tsai et al. concluded, “HICS provides a flexible framework that seems to have 
assisted NCKUH in the organization of its emergency response to the SARS 
                                            
31 Robert Powers, “Organization of a Hospital-Based Victim Decontamination Plan Using the 
Incident Command Structure,” International Journal of Trauma Nursing 5, no. 4 (October–
November 2007): 119–123.  
32 Ellen Lanser May, “Scarred but Smarter: Lessons Learned from Florida’s 2004 
Hurricanes,” Healthcare Executive 20, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 22–5. 
33 May, “Scarred but Smarter: Lessons Learned from Florida’s 2004 Hurricanes,” 22–5. 
34 “National Cheng Kung University Hospital, Tainan; Hospital Emergency Incident 




outbreak in Taiwan, ROC.”37 Specific details were provided regarding successful 
HICS implementation that include modifying HICS.  
A Hospitals and Health Networks journal article from 1995 entitled “The 
Day the Earth Moved” provides an anecdotal example of the use of HICS at 
Northridge Hospital Medical Center in response to the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake.38 The 1995 account of the chairman of Northridge Hospital Medical 
Center, Diane Lowder, indicated that HICS was essential to the successful 
response of the hospital when the 6.8 earthquake struck Northridge, California on 
January 17, 1994.39  
Ms. Lowder stated the HICS plan, 
not only worked, it also gave everyone a feeling of control, even 
when they didn’t have any. HICS was a major reason Northridge 
could effectively respond to one of the worst disasters in recent 
history. By ensuring communication, role clarification and an overall 
organized response, the plan helped the hospital remain 
operational, providing care to 1,400 victims.40  
The use of JASs that define the duties and roles for each HICS position seemed 
to be especially beneficial.  
A survey on the use of HICS was conducted six months after the 
earthquake of 60 employees who worked within the system during the first three 
days of incident response. Ms. Lowder stated, 
the overwhelming majority felt the plan had reduced their 
apprehension level once they were at work; they also said they 
would be less apprehensive when responding to a future disaster. 
They said the system gave them the support to provide patient care 
and meet patient needs during the disaster.41  
                                            
37 “National Cheng Kung University Hospital, Tainan; Hospital Emergency Incident 
Command System Implemented during SARS Outbreak.” 





This data from Northridge was the most detailed anecdote about HICS 
implementation. 
Since HICS is based on the principles of ICS, literature was reviewed 
regarding ICS to amplify the literature review that included research on case 
studies of ICS including, “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case 
Studies of Incident Command Systems” from the Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory42 and “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command 
System and NIMS” in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management that both support a strong sense of community among responders 
as a factor that supports the successful implementation of ICS principles.43 
Based on the aforementioned identified material, it is possible to identify 
potential factors that contributed to the perceived success of HICS.  
2. The Development of a HICS Implementation Model Using Four 
Identified Commonalities of the Perceived Successful 
Implementation of HICS  
The literature supports that a firm commitment of hospital executive 
leadership to implement HICS within a culture of preparedness is a 
critical factor in successful HICS implementation.  
Support for this commonality is cited from HICS implementation in San 
Diego and Boston, as well as from stakeholders at “The 2011 HICS National 
Summit” and from international use in the country of Iran. 
Mr. Chris Van Gorder, FACHE, President and CEO of SCRIPPS Health in 
San Diego, California is quoted in “The 2011 HICS National Summit 
Proceedings,” as proclaiming that “HICS is leadership in action”!44 Mr. Van 
Gorder described a culture of preparedness in stating that HICS is a significant 
                                            
42 Donald Moynihan, “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of 
Incident Command Systems,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19, no. 4 
(January 30, 2009): 895–915. 
43 Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. Aguirre, “A Critical Evaluation of the 
Incident Command System and NIMS,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 3, no. 3, article 1 (2006): 1–27. 
44 “The 2011 HICS National Summit Proceedings,” 12. 
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part of SCRIPPS’ infrastructure and is used at every opportunity, scaled up or 
down, for actual incidents as well as exercises.45 He urged the summit 
participants to lobby their executives to promote and encourage the use of HICS 
and stated that HICS saves his health system money.46  
In the same summit proceedings, the first best practice for implementing 
HICS by summit participants was “obtain executive support” and “low executive 
priority” was considered a barrier to effective HICS implementation.47 It is not 
possible to conclude if summit participants identified this best practice 
independently of Mr. Van Gorder’s strong recommendation. It seems that 
stakeholders would have noted the importance of executive support, regardless. 
Executive leadership’s commitment to a culture of preparedness was 
evident in Boston as Brigham & Women’s, Massachusetts General, and other 
Boston hospitals seemed proficient in implementing HICS in response to the 
Boston Marathon bombings. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, these two 
hospitals and four community hospitals that are all part of Partners HealthCare 
System, Inc., (PHS) participated in a comprehensive implementation of HICS 
system-wide.48 This was not a simple training program but a cultural embrace of 
HICS throughout this system. PHS convened a system-wide emergency 
preparedness task force that adopted HICS to provide the command structure 
that met the ideals the task force sought.49 A HICS planning group was 
established, the HICS organizational chart was tailored to each hospital and a 
methodical training program was developed and conducted that included 
administrative leadership.50 Table top exercises were strategically conducted 
                                            
45 “The 2011 HICS National Summit Proceedings,” 12. 
46 Ibid., 13. 
47 Ibid., 14–15. 
48 Richard Zane and Ann Prestipino, “Implementing the Hospital Emergency Incident 
Command System: An Integrated Delivery System’s Experience,” Prehospital and Disaster 
Medicine 19, no. 4 (October–December 2004): 311.  
49 Ibid., 312. 
50 Ibid., 313. 
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three months after initial training sessions and live drills simulating multi-casualty 
incidents tested competency.51 Ongoing refresher courses and drills are part of 
this comprehensive HICS implementation.52 Executive commitment includes a 
budget that supports planning, training, and exercises. 
Dr. Eric Goralnick, and Ron M. Walls of Boston’s Brigham & Women’s 
hospital, seem to agree with Mr. Van Gorder about culturally adopting HICS and 
asserted “HICS is not an ad hoc activity, it’s the result of a determined 
commitment to plan, prepare and train.”53  
The 2011 article from Iran entitled “Are Hospitals Ready to Respond to 
Disasters? Challenges, Opportunities and Strategies of the Hospital Emergency 
Incident Command System” asserts that HICS was not implemented successfully 
in the hospitals of Isfahan University of Medical Sciences due to a barrier of 
organizational culture and senior managers lacking a belief and commitment in 
the value of HICS.54  
A commitment from leadership is considered to be essential for the 
successful implementation of HICS in a hospital in the United States, as well as 
internationally. This is supported by hospitals from across the country that 
participated in the HICS National Summit, as well as specific HICS 
implementation in San Diego and Boston. In addition, the lack of executive 
support was considered a barrier to successful HICS implementation in Iran.  
Additionally, it appears that advance planning with community 
partners that includes training, drills and exercising are critical 
variables in successful HICS implementation. 
                                            
51 Zane and Prestipino, “Implementing the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System: 
An Integrated Delivery System’s Experience,” 314. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster.”  
54 Yarmohammadian et al., “Are Hospitals Ready to Respond to Disasters? Challenges, 
Opportunities and Strategies of Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS),” 1070–
1077.  
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Advance planning includes meetings, trainings, exercises, and HICS 
activations with fire, law, emergency medical services, and other community 
partners. This common practice is supported by the Boston and Northridge 
responses, as well as the HICS national summit participants and journal articles 
including two about ICS. 
The May 2013 edition of Massachusetts General Hospital’s newsletter 
cited training as the principle reason for the hospital’s success in the article 
“Training Made the Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon Tragedy.”55 
Dr. Alasdair Conn, Chief of Emergency Services at Massachusetts General 
Hospital (Mass General), cited training and repeated disaster drills as making the 
primary difference in this hospital’s success.56 Mass General and other Boston 
hospitals participated in exercises with local emergency medical services in a 
variety of disaster scenarios that would result in multi-casualty incidents.57 Dr. 
Eric Goralnick of Brigham & Women’s Hospital cited the culture of planning, 
training, and exercising or responding together with the community as 
contributing to the success of HICS and the hospital’s response as was the 
strong relationships the hospital had with all community response partners.58 
The article about Northridge “The Day the Earth Moved” emphasized the 
importance of drills.59 It is also possible that the Northridge Hospital Medical 
Center implemented HICS successfully because the hospital was affected by the 
civil unrest in Los Angeles related to the Rodney King verdict 18 months earlier 
and had the opportunity to address gaps identified with the disaster plan at that 
time.60  
                                            
55 Tomsho, “Training Made the Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon Tragedy.” 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster.”  
59 Lowder, “The Day the Earth Moved,” 32–3. 
60 Ibid. 
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The International Journal of Trauma Nursing’s 2007 article entitled 
“Organization of a Hospital-based Victim Decontamination Plan Using the 
Incident Command Structure” cited HICS as enhancing the effectiveness of 
hospital-based decontamination but emphasized that training and practice are 
key to success.61  
“The 2011 HICS National Summit Proceedings” emphasized the vital 
importance of training for the successful implementation of HICS and how 
SCRIPPS Health trains three to four people in each of the key roles and provides 
extensive cross-training within the system and local campuses.62 Of the 14 best 
practices for HICS implementation identified by the national stakeholders in 
attendance, six specifically addressed the importance of training.63 CEO Mr. Van 
Gorder also stated that SCRIPPS’ implementation of HICS helped strengthen the 
health system’s relationships with local fire and police departments that now 
consider SCRIPPS a valued response partner.64 The researcher asserts it is 
because hospital personnel use the same ICS terminology as fire and law first 
responders, and HICS implementation involves the liaison officer from the 
Hospital Command Center interfacing with the incident command post where the 
fire and/or law response is managed. 
The 2011 article from Iran entitled “Are Hospitals Ready to Respond to 
Disasters? Challenges, Opportunities and Strategies of Hospital Emergency 
Incident Command System (HEICS)” asserted that training the senior managers 
would persuade them on the value of HICS,65 and the 2012 article about Iran’s 
implementation of HICS “Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) 
                                            
61 Powers, “Organization of a Hospital-Based Victim Decontamination Plan Using the 
Incident Command Structure.” 
62 “The 2011 HICS National Summit Proceedings,” 13. 
63 Ibid., 15. 
64 Ibid., 12. 
65 Yarmohammadian et al., “Are Hospitals Ready to Respond to Disasters? Challenges, 
Opportunities and Strategies of Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS),” 1070–
1077.  
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Performance in Iran; Decision Making in Disasters” indicated standardized 
training is needed.66  
Studies on ICS also support the commonality of advanced planning with 
community partners that includes training, drills and exercising. The first 
conclusion in “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS” 
is “ICS works well when official responders have trained in ICS and have a 
strong sense of community.”67 This analysis was regarding the use of ICS in nine 
different disasters involving the participation of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA) Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) task forces. 
In “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident 
Command Systems” the evidence proposes that “trust and positive working 
relationships” were “critical factors in fostering crisis response coordination.”68 
The researcher asserts that a hospital’s advanced planning with community 
partners that includes training, drills, and exercising is an effective way to build 
trust and positive working relationships.  
The Boston and Northridge responses, the HICS summit stakeholders, 
journal articles, and ICS case studies corroborate the belief that advanced 
planning with community partners that includes training, drills, and exercising all 
support successful HICS implementation. 
An effective communication plan with redundancies for information 
management to both internal and external partners is another factor 
for successful HICS implementation. 
This commonality is supported by the Boston Marathon response, as well 
as the HICS summit stakeholders, a journal article, and the 911 Commission 
Report. 
                                            
66 Djalali et al., “Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) Performance in Iran; Decision 
Making in Disasters.” 
67 Buck et al., “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS,” 21. 
68 Moynihan, “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident 
Command Systems,” 909. 
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Gaps in communications capability present barriers when they occur in all 
aspects of emergency response. Decision-making ability is dependent on 
situational awareness, and comprehensive situational awareness is dependent 
on a solid communication plan. A clear communication plan that enables hospital 
staff to communicate internally with hospital staff, as well as externally with 
community response partners and the media, is essential. This involves 
technology and the use of radios.  
A predetermined communication plan was cited as vital at Brigham & 
Women’s Hospital during the Boston Marathon response, as well as a backup 
plan “and a backup for that backup” in CNN Money’s “Leading through a 
Disaster.”69  
The Journal of Nursing Administration published an article in February 
2006 entitled “High-Reliability Teams and Situation Awareness: Implementing a 
Hospital Emergency Incident Command System,” which states that situational 
awareness relates to team reliability in dynamic environments.70 Situational 
awareness cannot be maintained without an effective communication plan. 
“The 2011 HICS National Summit Proceedings” indicate that software 
programs and information technology (IT) are part of a communication plan, but a 
redundant plan that includes low tech (paper) is needed for when a power outage 
occurs and/or IT access is not available.71 
The 9/11 Commission Report cited the breakdown in radio 
communications among first responders as a contributing factor to the firefighter 
                                            
69 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster,” 2. 
70 Pamela Autrey and Jacqueline Moss, “High-Reliability Teams and Situation Awareness: 
Implementing a Hospital Emergency Incident Command System,” Journal of Nursing 
Administration 36, no. 2 (February 2006): 67–72.  
71 “The HICS National Summit Proceedings,” 15. 
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fatalities in the north tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.72 
The inability to communicate had tragic consequences in this example. 
In addition to communicating internally with hospital staff, hospitals need 
to communicate effectively with community response partners with whom they 
must work successfully during an incident. The HICS structure identifies the 
liaison officer stationed in the hospital command center who may communicate 
or interface with the field incident command post and/or the local emergency 
operations center. The hospital IC has the ability to interface with the IC, unified 
command, or area command, depending on the size and complexity of the 
incident and must have the ability to communicate. The public information officer 
(PIO) may interface with the PIO at the incident command post or the local 
emergency operations center to assure consistent messaging as part of the Joint 
Information System for the community.  
Redundancies enable communication when primary communication 
methods fail. The ability of the hospital to communicate internally and with 
community response partners is critical for a coordinated response. 
The modification of HICS to the individual hospital’s or health 
system’s needs is a critical factor as part of the planning process. 
This commonality is supported by the Boston response, two journal 
articles including the modification of HICS in Taiwan, and the 2011 HICS Summit 
stakeholders. 
HICS allows for the modification of positions or creation of new positions 
depending on the needs of the hospital or the complexity of the incident. All the 
HICS JASs and forms are designed to be individualized and modified to meet the 
needs of a hospital or health system. In addition, supplemental forms may be 
added to tailor HICS implementation to meet the needs of a hospital.  
                                            
72 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Authorized Edition), 
(Washington, DC: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), 319–323. 
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The 2005 Law and Health Weekly article entitled “National Cheng Kung 
University Hospital, Tainan; Hospital Emergency Incident Command System 
Implemented during SARS Outbreak” stated that four newly created HICS 
positions and JASs were created and determined to be helpful during this 
hospital’s 2003 SARS response.73  
NCKUH HICS leaders created a total of four new HICS positions and 
JASs for the SARS outbreak including an “infection control officer” and “isolation 
unit leader.”74 Six new HICS subunits were created including “fever screening” 
and “employee isolation inside the hospital.”75  
In addition to modifying existing forms or creating supplemental forms, 
new positions may be created that add to the HIMT organizational chart, as was 
demonstrated in Taiwan. 
The Massachusetts General Hospital newsletter article “Training Made the 
Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon Tragedy” stated that this hospital 
modified HICS to include procedures on how to purchase equipment, such as 
ventilators.76  
In the 2008 Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness article 
“Surge Capacity Concepts for Health Care Facilities: The CO-S-TR Model for 
Initial Incident Assessment” Drs. John Hick and Kristi Koenig et al. asserted that 
the NIMS-compliant HICS has greatly improved hospital preparedness, in 
general, but the system does not provide adequate guidance to assist hospital 
leaders in conducting initial assessments and making informed decisions in the 
immediate aftermath of an emergency, as response activities are being 
                                            
73 “National Cheng Kung University Hospital, Tainan; Hospital Emergency Incident 
Command System Implemented during SARS Outbreak,” 278.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Tomsho, “Training Made the Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon Tragedy.” 
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initiated.77 They describe their development of an adjunctive tool to HICS that 
assists hospitals with conducting initial assessments as response activities are 
being initiated.78 It is one example of a supplemental form to HICS. 
Minor modifications to HICS to meet the individual needs of a hospital are 
acceptable, such as tailoring HICS forms and JASs or creating new positions to 
meet the needs of an incident. However, an element of caution should be taken 
before modifying HICS significantly. A key strength to HICS is that it enables 
hospitals to use common ICS language with first responder partners. If the 
system is modified such that fire, law, and EMS first responders do not 
understand it, it may undermine a coordinated response.  
3. Literature Review Summary 
The 2013 Boston Marathon anecdotes represent the perspective of two 
physicians cited in two on-line articles. Although they are credible witnesses and 
cited specifics about the use of HICS, their contribution cannot be described as 
research. The 2005 article about Taiwan represented a survey of staff and 
provided compelling anecdotes about the benefit of modifying HICS with the 
specifics of how this assisted a SARS response. Prior to this incident, the last 
detailed example of HICS implementation for an emergency response was from 
the 1994 Northridge earthquake response where a staff survey was the source of 
data. Other articles tout the benefit of HICS or cite it as a best practice but 
provide no examples of HICS implementation. A California health system 
president and CEO cited anecdotal evidence about HICS implementation and 40 
HICS stakeholders from around the country provided input, but this is reflected in 
the written proceedings from “The 2011 HICS National Summit,” not a research 
article. Although the available literature on HICS implementation was not 
extensive, four commonalities that support the perceived successful 
                                            
77 John Hick et al., “Surge Capacity Concepts for Health Care Facilities: The CO-S-TR Model 
for Initial Incident Assessment,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 2 (September 
2008): S51–57S.  
78 Ibid. 
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implementation of HICS were identified and build a model for successful 
implementation.  
A research endeavor of HICS implementation during an emergency 
response appears timely, if not overdue. 
4. Model Summary 
The proposed model is centered around four elements identified as 
commonalities in the literature: (1) a firm commitment of hospital executive 
leadership to implement HICS within a culture of preparedness, (2) advance 
planning with community partners that includes training, drills, and exercising, (3) 
an effective communication plan with redundancies for information management, 
(4) and the modification of HICS as part of planning to meet the hospital’s or 
health system’s needs.  
The HICS implementation model proposes that if a hospital implements 
HICS and embraces the four commonalities, the hospital will then perceive HICS 
to be successful during an actual incident.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Object 
The object of study is the implementation of HICS by Stanford Medicine, 
and specifically tested in response to Asiana. Stanford Medicine is comprised of 
Stanford Hospital, also known as Stanford Health Care; Lucile Packard 
Children’s’ Hospital, also known as Stanford Children’s Health; and the Stanford 
University School of Medicine.  
This also required an analysis of Stanford’s adoption of HICS as a 
component of the hospital’s EMP.  
2. Selection Criteria 
Stanford’s selection as the object of a single case study is also related to a 
limitation as an object of research. As the second highest ranked hospital in 
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California by the U.S. News and World Report,79 it could be suggested that 
Stanford has a robust EMP, and therefore, Stanford’s implementation of HICS 
would reveal lessons that could benefit other healthcare organizations across the 
country. In addition, the response to this plane crash equated to a mass-casualty 
incident (MCI) response that can be generalized to other MCI responses 
hospitals across the country experience in comparison to a less common 
scenario, such as an earthquake. A case study of an earthquake response might 
be of less benefit to hospitals not at risk for earthquakes.  
This incident is of interest to the national healthcare community since 
Asiana received national attention at San Francisco International Airport (SFO).  
According to Robert K. Yin in Case Study Research, Design and Methods, 
a single case study may be used to validate a theory.80 Yin goes on to state, “the 
single case can represent a significant contribution to knowledge and theory 
building by confirming, challenging, or extending the theory.”81 In a similar vein, a 
single case study may also be used to test or generate a hypothesis. This case 
study was chosen to test the hypothesis that successful HICS implementation is 
dependent on four commonalities identified from the literature review. After an 
analysis of Stanford’s EMP was conducted, the case study evolved into testing 
the hypothesis that the practice of four commonalities would lead to the 
perceived successful implementation of HICS. 
3. Study Limitations 
This study was limited to retrospective written documentation available for 
analysis and did not include human subjects. Staff surveys were not conducted.  
The research involved a review of the hospital’s EMP and plan with 
emphasis on the hospital’s adoption of HICS.  
                                            
79 “Stanford Hospital and Clinics,” accessed June 10, 2014, http://health.usnews.com/best-
hospitals/area/ca/stanford-hospital-and-clinics-6932330.  
80 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research, Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2014), 51. 
81 Ibid. 
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Another limitation for this thesis could also be considered a positive factor. 
The pre-determined excellence of the selected hospital for study, Stanford 
Hospital and Clinics in Palo Alto, CA, is ranked nationally in 13 adult specialties 
by U.S. News and World Report. It is ranked #1 in the San Jose, CA metropolitan 
area and ranked #2 in the state of California.82 The findings that led to Stanford’s 
success may be difficult to replicate for hospitals with fewer resources, but since 
Stanford is among the better hospitals in the country and known for excellence, 
theoretically, this could provide an ideal setting to learn about HICS 
implementation.  
Another possible limitation is the edition of HICS used for this response. 
The Fifth Edition of HICS was released in May 2014, and this study will address 
the implementation of the Fourth Edition of HICS released in October 2006. The 
basic structure and components of the system are unchanged however, and the 
edition studied should not be of significance for individuals knowledgeable about 
HICS. The Fifth Edition includes updated terminology more consistent with the 
NIMS and includes IPGs and IRGs for new scenarios, such as “active shooter.”  
A sensitivity for this thesis is the researcher’s relationship to HICS. She 
served as the program coordinator for the Fourth Edition of HICS and was the 
executive sponsor for the Fifth Edition on behalf of the California EMSA. This 
researcher acknowledges the potential bias and has endeavored to be objective. 
4. Instrumentation 
A site visit to Stanford Hospital was conducted on October 28 and 29, 
2014, and March 10, 2015. In addition to the hospital’s 57-page confidential 
EOP, and 18-page PIO response guide, all documentation Stanford presented 
regarding this response to Asiana was reviewed, which included the hospital 
AAR, the incident action plan (IAP), the hospital incident management team 
chart, the IPGs, the JASs, the communication plan, and HICS forms. Available 
training records from the previous five years were reviewed, as were available 
                                            
82 “Stanford Hospital and Clinics.” 
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AARs from exercises from the previous five years. Any available documentation 
that involved the hospital’s adoption of HICS was reviewed, such as HICS 
training requirements for staff, or any policy memos related to HICS. News 
articles were also reviewed.  
Documentation was reviewed for the purpose of identifying answers to the 
questions in Appendix A that relate to the four commonalities identified in the 
literature review. Questions and sub-questions were developed and answered, 
as the documentation was reviewed at Stanford to analyze each commonality.  
5. Steps of Analysis 
This single case study began as a test of the hypothesis that successful 
HICS implementation is dependent on critical factors for preparing a hospital to 
implement HICS identified from available literature: (1) a firm commitment of 
hospital executive leadership to implement HICS within a culture of 
preparedness, (2) advance planning with community partners that includes 
training, drills, and exercising, (3) an effective communication plan with 
redundancies for information management, and (4) the modification of HICS as 
part of planning for the individual hospital’s or health system’s needs.  
As part of the case study test, Stanford’s EMP was analyzed. It was 
determined the four commonalities are practiced at Stanford. This case study 
examined whether the practice of four commonalities would lead to the perceived 
successful implementation of HICS. General feedback about HICS from Stanford 
was reviewed during the course of research, and an evaluation of perceived 
success was measured and is discussed.  
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter II describes Stanford Medicine and the robust Stanford EMP. 
Chapter III analyzes Stanford’s adoption of HICS, which appears to be 
institutionalized to emergency operations with an average of 29.6 HICS 
activations annually. The depth of the HIMT is discussed and assistive tools, 
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such as The Public Information Officer Response Guide and The Hospital 
Command Center (HCC) Set Up Guide are reviewed. Detailed step-by-step 
instructions provide clarity, such that it appears the HCC could be quickly 
activated even if the most trained staff are not present. A five-year analysis for 
the years that preceded Asiana is described with a delineation of emergency 
responses from drills and exercises.  
Chapter IV discusses the steps of analysis. An analysis of the Stanford 
EMP was conducted, and it was determined that the four commonalities 
identified for successful HICS implementation are practiced at Stanford Medicine. 
Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that Stanford personnel would perceive HICS 
implementation to be successful in response to Asiana. This hypothesis was 
tested with the Asiana response discussed next. 
Chapter V describes Asiana from the perspective of the medical response. 
Stanford’s response is discussed with a summary timeline of the flow of 55 
incoming patients. All Asiana after action review documents were reviewed and 
analyzed including “debrief data collection forms” and “debrief emails.” The AAR 
stated, “The established HICS processes and procedures worked.” Two negative 
comments regarding HICS were reviewed and analyzed from the data collection 
forms. 
Chapter VI presents findings. The tested hypothesis was supported. The 
practice of the four commonalities led to the perceived successful implementation 
of HICS, specifically in promoting effective communication. However, the four 
commonalities may not be granular enough for future evaluations and may be 
further delineated. One negative comment about HICS was addressed in the 
Fifth Edition released in May 2014.  
Chapter VII presents the conclusion. The hypothesis that these four 
commonalities support the perceived successful implementation of HICS was 
supported: (1) a firm commitment of hospital executive leadership to implement 
HICS within a culture of preparedness, (2) advanced planning with community 
partners that includes training, drills, and exercising, (3) an effective 
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communication plan with redundancies for information management, and (4) the 
modification of HICS to the individual hospital’s or health system’s needs as part 
of planning. 
Six critical factors were identified from the four commonalities and 
comprise a HICS implementation model that may serve as a predictor of 
successful HICS implementation. 
In addition to the lessons learned that support the tested hypothesis, the 
documentation reviewed described highly competent individuals and cohesive 
teamwork. It is not possible to separate individual and team competence from the 
tested hypothesis. 
Chapter VIII presents recommendations for users of HICS, future revisions 
of HICS, and future research. 
Recommendations for users of HICS include the implementation of six 
critical factors that form a HICS implementation model that provides a foundation 
for effective hospital emergency management at the organizational level and may 
serve as a predictor of successful HICS implementation, 
Recommendations for future revisions of HICS include incorporating a 
number of HICS modifications developed by Stanford. The addition of Appendix 
K, the HICS implementation model, to the HICS guidebook may be sent to 
California EMSA for consideration of changes to future editions and to provide 
data for future research. 
Future research is recommended to test the HICS implementation model 
as a predictor of successful HICS implementation.  
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II. STANFORD MEDICINE AND THE STANFORD EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM  
This chapter describes Stanford Medicine and Stanford’s EMP. The 
description of the EMP and EOP provides foundational knowledge for a 
subsequent analysis of whether the commonalities identified in the literature 
review are practiced at Stanford. 
A. STANFORD MEDICINE 
Stanford Medicine is comprised of Stanford Hospital, also known as 
Stanford Health Care, Lucile Packard Children’s’ Hospital, also known as 
Stanford Children’s Health, and the Stanford University School of Medicine.  
The Stanford Office of Emergency Management (OEM) offers this 
description of Stanford Medicine: 
STANFORD MEDICINE delivers unparalleled care for each 
patient’s unique needs. Our multidisciplinary approach to health 
care coordinates deep expertise with the most advanced 
technology for the best possible outcomes. Comprised of Stanford 
Health Care, Stanford Children’s Health and the Stanford University 
School of Medicine.  
At Stanford Health Care, we seek to provide patients with the very 
best in diagnosis and treatment, with outstanding quality, 
compassion and coordination. With an unmatched track record of 
scientific discovery, technological innovation and translational 
medicine, Stanford Medicine physicians are pioneering leading 
edge therapies today that will change the way health care is 
delivered tomorrow. 
As part of our spirit of discovery, we also leverage our deep 
relationships with luminary Silicon Valley companies to develop 
new ways to deliver preeminent patient care. 
Stanford Children’s Health is the only network in the area—and one 
of the few in the country—exclusively dedicated to pediatric and 
obstetric care. Our doctors and facilities bring our Stanford 
Children’s Health level of extraordinary care to our multiple 
specialty locations, pediatric practices and partner hospital 
locations across the entire San Francisco Bay Area which means 
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that a Stanford Children’s Health physician is easy to access, 
closer to home.83 
The following hospital statistics were also provided and noted to be 
accurate as of July 10, 2014.84 These statistics provide an overview of the size 
and scope of Stanford Medicine.  
 
 Stanford Health Care Lucile Packard Children’s 
Hospital Stanford | Stanford 
Children’s Health 
Founded 1959 1991 
Licensed Beds 613 (475 operating)  311 (52 OB, 259 peds) 
ED 39 (using 11 on H1) 9 
























 958 medical staff 
 3257 employees 
Volunteers 1,050 853 
Patient Visit info/stats 
 Inpatient 
 Outpatient visits 







 4467 obstetric patients 
 12,671 pediatric 
inpatients 
 350,000 clinic visits 
 4200 births 
 Served patients from 32 




                                            
83 Brandon Bond (Administrative Director of the Stanford Office of Emergency Management), 
email message to the author, February 2, 2015. 
84 Ibid. Fiscal year 2014 hospital statistics. 
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B. STANFORD MEDICINE’S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
Stanford’s EMP, the delegated authority of the OEM, the governance 
structure, the EOP, and Stanford’s integration with the community demonstrates 
foundational support and commitment by hospital executive leadership to 
emergency preparedness, as well as Stanford’s strong community partnerships. 
The support and delegated authority of the Stanford OEM is formalized via 
signed policy and delegation with four signatories, specifically the chief executive 
officers and chief operating officers of both Stanford Health Care and Stanford 
Children’s Health.85 
This delegation and policy acknowledges that the success of the OEM is 
dependent upon the active involvement of multiple stakeholders and the 
community, and the core responsibilities of reviewing and testing the core 
elements of the OEM rests with the multi-disciplinary emergency management 
governance structure.86  
The position of the OEM administrative director is designated as the 
organization’s emergency management officer and is responsible for the overall 
program coordination through the emergency management governance 
structure.87  
The clarity of the delegation and policy suggests strong executive support 
for the OEM and empowerment of the OEM administrative director while 
acknowledging the importance of community and stakeholder support. 
1. Stanford Governance Structure for the Office of Emergency 
Management  
The “Governance Structure for Fiscal Year 2014” was reviewed and 
serves as Appendix D. The Emergency Management Steering Committee is 
                                            
85 Stanford OEM Emergency Management Program Authority. 
86 Stanford Health Care and Stanford Children’s Health OEM Emergency Management 
Program Authority document. 
87 Ibid. 
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overseen by the hospital boards, medical executive committees, and quality 
improvement committees of Stanford Hospital and Clinics and Lucile Packard 
Children’s Hospital. Community representation on the steering committee 
includes the City of Palo Alto, Hospital Councils for Stanford Medical Center and 
Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Stanford University’s Emergency 
Management Committee and the Emergency Management Group from SFO. 
The chair of the emergency management steering committee is the OEM 
administrative director. Eleven steering committee subcommittees perform 
planning tasks, five of which are named according to specific HICS functions or 
roles.88  
These steering subcommittees are: 
 Logistics (HICS function/role) 
 Operations (HICS function/role) 
 Planning (HICS function/role) 
 Finance (HICS function/role) 
 Mitigation 
 Business continuity planning/technology 
 Contingency 
 Public information officer (HICS function/role) 
 Emergency response team leads 
 Senior physician disaster management committee 
 Emergency infectious diseases/bioterrorism89  
Naming five steering subcommittees after specific HICS functions or roles 
seems to reinforce the adoption of HICS and institutionalize HICS terms. 
Members of the steering committee include subcommittee co-chairs, senior Vice 
presidents, physicians and other leaders who receive technical subject matter 
expertise from departments across the health system including nursing, general 
services, and ancillary services.90 This involvement of senior leadership appears 
indicative of strong executive support for emergency management. 
                                            
88 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Hospital and Clinics, 2013), 6. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 7. 
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2. The Emergency Operations Plan  
The extensive EOP with 18 supplemental annexes and the frequency in 
which it is reviewed and revised seem to indicate that the effectiveness of the 
plan is a priority for the health system. The EOP is reviewed annually for 
effectiveness with emergency responses and exercises by the emergency 
management steering committee before the end of the first quarter of each 
calendar year.91 According to the EOP, it is this annual evaluation that drives the 
annual revision process based on lessons learned. The board at each hospital, 
senior leadership, quality committees, and the medical evaluation committee 
review this evaluation as part of an annual program review.92  
Section I of the EOP discusses Stanford’s planning process:  
The mission of this Emergency Operations Plan is to ensure an all 
hazards approach so that Stanford Hospital and Clinics (SHC) and 
Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital (LPCH) have adequate plans 
and resources to effectively respond to all types of incidents, and to 
facilitate the education, training, and testing of all hospital staff to 
respond to the consequences of any internal or external disaster or 
planned event.93 
Twelve specific objectives of the EOP are defined and appear to be 
comprehensive in that they address all areas of facility operations and service 
delivery and their continuity. 
 EOP Objectives 
 Coordinate unified facility-wide command 
 Provide preliminary medical and/or surgical services to the 
victims 
 Provide ongoing support and care to existing patients 
 Protect and sustain all responding staff members 
 Coordinate prompt transfer of casualties to the most 
appropriate facility for administering effective care 
                                            
91 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 7. The researcher reviewed the annual revision dates. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid., 5. 
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 Initiate procedures for prompt discharge or transfer of 
patients who can be moved without jeopardizing their health 
or recovery from either hospital to another facility 
 Provide security services to manage personnel access to 
emergency response areas at either hospital; and/or, the 
hospital grounds 
 Provide relevant and appropriate information to the public, 
community, staff, and/or patients 
 Convert usable space in defined areas for efficient patient 
care services 
 Maintain availability of adequate basic utilities, supplies 
and/or any identified critical assets 
 Protect and maintain physical plant facilities 
 Provide social services, including religious, mental health 
support, and crisis management to staff, patients, and 
visitors.94  
Specific compliance with regulatory agencies is cited, such as Cal/OSHA 
(California Occupational Safety and Health Administration), the California State 
Fire Marshall, and The Joint Commission (previously named the Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Facilities).95 This is noted 
because it answers sub-questions asked as part of Question I of Appendix A in 
analyzing one aspect of hospital leadership’s commitment to a culture of 
preparedness by assuring compliance with regulatory standards. 
3. Community Integration 
Significant documentation in the EOP supports Stanford’s strong 
integration with community partners, which supports one of the four 
commonalities identified in the literature review for the perceived successful 
implementation of HICS. It includes the incorporation of the emergency 
management objectives of the City of Palo Alto’s Office of Emergency Services 
(OES) into the EOP. The adoption of the city’s objectives into the health system’s 
plans seems to extend beyond Stanford’s recognized need of the community and 
                                            
94 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 6. 
95 Ibid., 7. 
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may imply that Stanford Medicine endeavors to serve by also making the 
community’s emergency preparedness and response a priority.  
The development of structures that link the City’s incident command 
system to non-governmental organizations is also cited.96 The adoption and 
implementation of HICS accomplishes this link for Stanford. 
Broad community and business partnerships that support continuity of 
operations after a disaster involve memoranda of understanding or contracts with 
hospitals in Santa Clara County, as well as the Palo Alto Medical Foundation, 
Palo Alto Veterans’ Health Systems Administration, American Red Cross Bay 
Area, and all key vendors who provide essential services to Stanford Medicine.97 
Stanford’s OEM is an active member of the City of Palo Alto emergency 
preparedness task force and is also represented on the Palo Alto/Stanford 
Citizens’ Corps Council with community representatives, such as the City of Palo 
Alto public safety: police, fire/EMS, OES; the business sector/Chamber of 
Commerce, Silicon Valley/Red Cross, as well as Stanford University.98 
County-wide emergency preparedness activities expand beyond the 
borders of Santa Clara County where Stanford is located to neighboring San 
Mateo County as well. The OEM participates on the Hospital Council-Santa Clara 
County Emergency Preparedness Partnership and the San Mateo County 
Healthcare Working Group.99 These committees have cross-cutting county-wide 
objectives that span hospital specific plans for topics, such as surge 
management, evacuation, pandemic, and mass fatality.100 
                                            
96 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 8. 
97 Ibid., 9. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid. 
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Each facility’s HVA is reviewed annually with community partners as part 
of the annual EOP evaluation.101 
Stanford Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital are also 
members of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to which they agree 
to provide a certain number of acute care hospital beds to treat patients in the 
event of a federally declared emergency.102 
The EOP also includes specific actions that define how the hospitals will 
participate in a multi-agency coordination system during a community-wide 
disaster.103 It is not only consistent with NIMS, but the detail reflects a deep 
understanding of the need for public and private entities within the community to 
respond together. 
This chapter provided foundational knowledge of Stanford Medicine and 
Stanford’s EMP with an emphasis on Stanford’s integration with the community. 
The next chapter focuses on Stanford’s adoption of HICS before the following 
chapters depict an analysis of the commonalities identified in the literature review 
and how they are practiced at Stanford. 
                                            
101 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 11. 
102 Ibid., 10. 
103 Ibid. 
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF HICS IMPLEMENTATION BY STANFORD 
MEDICINE 
It is important to describe Stanford Medicine’s comprehensive EMP before 
focusing on how Stanford adopted HICS. This chapter emphasizes how HICS 
was adopted and implemented at Stanford before Asiana and subsequent 
analysis of the implementation of HICS for that response.  
The extensive detailed documentation describing HICS seems to 
exemplify the commitment of hospital leadership to implement HICS supporting a 
commonality identified in the literature review for perceived successful HICS 
implementation. An entire section of the EOP is devoted to Stanford’s 
administrative and cultural adoption of HICS to provide for coordination of 
hospital and community resources during an emergency response.104 Highlights 
from the documentation demonstrate executive commitment. 
The EOP states relative to HICS:  
Its primary purpose is to provide administrative coordination and 
support for all hospital resources allocated to the response effort 
and to establish effective communication and coordination with 
internal and external response partners to facilitate maintenance of 
hospital operations.105 
The HICS structure is modified to provide an organizational response 
structure for the two hospitals, Stanford Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s 
Hospital, if both hospitals are affected by an incident.106 The HCC is the HICS 
term for what equates to a hospital emergency operations center.107 The primary 
HCC is maintained at Stanford and Lucile Packard maintains the secondary 
                                            
104 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 12. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 The hospital EOC was renamed the HCC for the Fourth Edition of HICS for consistency 
with NIMS at the request of Ex Officio member Al Fluman, the director of the NIMS Integration 
Center at that time, now called the National Integration Center. 
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HCC. The HICS structure provides for two ICs, two operations chiefs, and two 
planning chiefs for each respective hospital if necessary who may work out of the 
primary HCC or could work out of the two depending on the incident if both are 
activated.108 Policies and procedures for activating and deactivating HICS are 
identified. In accordance with HICS, as well as ICS, staff serving in a HICS role 
report to their supervisor on the HICS HIMT organizational chart, regardless of to 
whom they may report during their daily duties when HICS is not activated. JASs 
are provided for each position. Only positions necessary for an incident are 
activated as HICS is scalable.  
HICS is used in the management of every emergency event, regardless of 
size.109 As part of the EOP section devoted to HICS, 11 detailed objectives 
identify how the EOP is also consistent with the NIMS.110 Satellite operation 
centers (SOC) are established so that offsite clinics will coordinate 
communications with the HCC.111  
A policy of participating in unified command provides for integration of 
hospital operations with a community-wide response. This policy could occur with 
Stanford Hospital and/or Lucile Packard staff or liaison officers integrated into the 
field incident command post or the city emergency operations center (EOC) or 
other designated location.112 
The commitment to implement HICS regardless of the size of an 
emergency event and detailed policies describing HICS implementation suggest 
a cultural adoption of HICS. 
                                            
108 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Confidential Do Not 
Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 12. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid., 13. 
111 Ibid., 14. 
112 Ibid. 
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A. THE HOSPITAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM  
The HIMT provides the foundation of the HICS organizational structure. 
The functions of the positions Stanford is prepared to staff, and the number of 
people trained in each position, shows the depth of Stanford’s preparedness and 
demonstrates a firm commitment to adopt HICS within a culture of preparedness.  
Both Stanford Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital have 
identified three individuals by name who may fill each of the command and 
general staff positions on the HIMT.113  
 Incident Commander  
 Organizes and directs the HCC 
 Gives overall strategic direction for hospital incident 
management and support activities 
 Public Information Officer (PIO) 
 Serves as the conduit for information to internal and external 
stakeholders, including staff, visitors, families, and the media 
as approved by the IC 
 Liaison Officer 
 Serves as the incident contact person in the HCC for 
representatives from other agencies 
 Safety Officer 
 Ensures safety of staff, patients and visitors 
 Monitors and corrects hazardous conditions (has authority to 
halt any operation that poses immediate threat to life and 
health) 
 Security Officer 
 Stanford-named position114  
 Appears to serve as security services director/law 
enforcement interface representative (applicable for the 
                                            
113 Bullets are summarized from the JAS for each position. 
114 Security officer, ambulatory branch director, materials management, and engineering and 
maintenance branch director reflect day-to-day operations intentionally left off of the HIMT chart 
akin to radiology, environmental services, central supply, etc.  
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Asiana response in consideration of multiple law 
enforcement entities including Homeland Security 
Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and 
Customs and Border Patrol) 
 Medical Technical Specialist 
 Serves as subject matter expert(s) for issues relevant to the 
specific incident  
Three individuals are also identified by name for each Section Chief 
Position.  
 Operations Section Chief 
 Develops and implements strategy and tactics to execute the 
objectives 
 Organizes, assigns, and supervises staging, medical care, 
infrastructure, security, hazardous materials and business 
continuity branch resources 
 Planning Section Chief 
 Oversees all incident-related data gathering and analysis 
regarding incident operations and assigned resources 
 Develops alternatives for tactical operations 
 Conducts planning meetings 
 Prepares the incident action plan (IAP) for each operational 
period 
 Logistics Section Chief 
 Organizes and directs the operations associated with 
maintenance of the physical environment and with the 
provision of human resources, material, and services to 
support incident activities 
 Participates in incident action planning 
 Finance/Administration Section Chief 
 Monitors the utilization of financial assets and the accounting 
for financial expenditures  
 Supervises the documentation of expenditures and cost 
reimbursement activities 
Three individuals are identified who may fill the branch director positions 
under operations.  
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 Medical Branch Director 
 Organizes and manages the delivery of emergency, 
inpatient, outpatient, casualty care, and clinical support 
services  
 Ambulatory Branch Director  
 Stanford-named position 
 Appears to organize and manage the delivery of ambulatory 
care 
Three individuals are identified who may fill the positions under logistics.  
 Materials Management  
 Stanford-named position 
 Appears to manage and organize logistics at the direction of 
the logistics chief 
 Engineering and Maintenance Branch Director 
 Stanford-named position 
 Appears to oversee engineering and maintenance as the title 
suggests 
In addition to showing the depth of staff trained and prepared to staff the 
HIMT, the aforementioned positions also show four positions Stanford named 
that are not officially-named HICS positions. This demonstrates one example of 
the fourth commonality identified in the literature review for successful HICS 
implementation, a modification of HICS to support the hospital’s needs. It 
appears these positions were named to precisely reflect the day-to-day duties of 
the staff who fill them. 
B. THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER RESPONSE GUIDE  
The 18-page PIO response guide shows the commitment and advance 
preparation of Stanford Medicine to impart public information effectively and 
communicate with external community partners.  
The guide includes a PIO response checklist for the media briefing area, 
the media staging/holding area, the joint information center, media backpacks, 
methods for communicating to staff, and notifications (internal and external). 
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Step-by-step directions are given for methods of communication including 16 
different message templates for posting to emergency hotlines, as well as 
frequently asked questions with answers.  
The detailed instructions to staff to be assigned to the PIO position(s) 
appear to enhance the ability of Stanford to communicate internally with staff and 
externally with the media and community effectively. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that this assistive tool strengthens the effectiveness of at least part of the 
communication plan, while also reinforcing an infrastructure conducive to 
successful communication. 
C. THE HOSPITAL COMMAND CENTER SET UP GUIDE 
Incident management occurs at the HCC (Figure 1). The hospital incident 
management team positions described in Section I of this chapter work within the 
HCC or typically report to a position who works in the HCC depending on 
assigned duties. The HCC set up guide demonstrates the detailed advance 
preparation Stanford undertook in assuring the HCC could be set up quickly for 
any event. During a site visit to Stanford, the HCC was observed and the 
accuracy of the HCC set up guide was verified, which further demonstrates 
Stanford’s attention to detail for emergency preparedness. 
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Figure 1.  Stanford’s Hospital Command Center115  
The detailed 15-page HCC set up guide was reviewed that provides 
specific chronological step-by-step directions with photographs that illustrate how 
to open and activate the HCC.116 An HCC Quick Reference Guide with floor plan 
layout that identifies the specific location of resources is visually precise. It also 
contains the assigned location of HICS positions and the contents of seven 
storage cabinets that include position binders, HICS vests that staffs wear to 
identify their HICS roles, phones, HICS forms, office supplies, laptops, printers, 
fax machines, a DVD player, and emergency supplies. The communications 
closet also contains radios, centrexes, and laptops. Audio-visual capability is 
present, as are ample white boards and planning boards. An additional floor plan 
illustrates the location of specific jacks for VoIP phones and analog phones that 
correlate with the applicable HICS position and phone number.  
Photographs illustrate the contents of each cabinet and closet. An 
extensive collection of base station radios, handheld radios, and satellite phones 
are present with a channel guide located in the communications closet, as well 
as in the HCC set up guide. A visual aid with precise directions to operate 
                                            
115 “When Plane-crash Victims Arrived at Stanford Medicine, Response Teams Were 
Ready,” July 8, 2013, http://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2013/07/when-plane-crash-victims-
arrived-at-stanford-medicine-response-teams-were-ready.html. Photo courtesy of Brandon Bond. 
116 Stanford Hospital and Clinics, Lucile Packard Children’s Center, Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) Hospital Command Center Set Up Guide (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Hospital 
and Clinics, 2013).  
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handheld radios and satellite phones is also present in this closet and in the HCC 
set up guide as well.  
Conference call instructions are detailed and wireless Internet information 
with passcodes is provided. Information on the electronic bed polling system, 
EMSystem’s “EMResource” is provided with web addresses, logins and 
passwords although it is usually completed in the emergency department. This 
system can also be used to declare interruptions to services to the county 
emergency medical services agency.117 Information on the internal hospital 
alerting system is also provided, as are instructions on how to mirror an Apple 
iPhone or iPad onto the HCC TV, and how to use the mobile wireless hotspots 
also stored in the communications closet. 
The attention to detail and step-by-step instructions provide clear direction 
in setting up the HCC and appear to enable the hospital to organize and activate 
quickly the HCC even if the most trained or experienced staff are not present. It 
seems to further suggest a commitment to HICS within a culture of 
preparedness.  
D. BOX REVIEW 
To assess the extent of Stanford’s commitment to HICS activations and 
exercises as part of assessing the applicability of the commonalities identified in 
the literature review, the frequency of HICS activations over a five-year period, 
from 2009 through 2013, was conducted on the Stanford OEM’s secure online 
“Box” account.118 This time frame preceded Asiana, and this duration was 
selected to review the HICS activity prior to Asiana. The time frame of five years 
was chosen (2009–2013) to show HICS activity over a period of time that was 
not short term to show HICS activity that was not “ad hoc,” which was keeping in 
mind the statement of Boston’s Brigham & Women’s hospital personnel that 
                                            
117 Stanford Hospital and Clinics, Lucile Packard Children’s Center, Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) Hospital Command Center Set Up Guide, 13. 
118 Box offers cloud storage and file sharing services that enable the secure access and 
sharing of files online. 
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stated “HICS is not an ad hoc activity. It’s the result of a determined commitment 
to plan, prepare, and train.”119 
The number of HICS activations observed and reviewed on Box are as 
follows. 
 2009: Twenty-six HICS activations, 10 for real incidents, such as a 
South Bay phone outage, a power outage, and H1N1 influenza, 16 
for drills/exercises 
 2010: Thirty-two HICS activations, eight for real incidents, such as 
the San Bruno Gas line explosion, a planned network upgrade, and 
IT issues in one department, 15 for drills/exercises 
 2011: Twenty-seven HICS activations, 13 for real incidents, such as 
a water line break, a planned IT upgrade, and a missing child; 14 
for drills/exercises 
 2012: Thirty-four HICS activations, 18 for real incidents, such as a 
gas line failure, a planned electrical utility shutdown, and a slow IT 
network, 16 for drills/exercises 
 2013: Twenty-nine HICS activations, 13 for real incidents, such as 
Asiana, a water leak, and a steam outage, 16 for drills/exercises 
These activations include quarterly unannounced drills for HICS 
activations and monthly exercises. Drills and exercises include communications 
drills and radio tests, and exercises involving scenarios, such as an earthquake, 
an active shooter, a missing child, a power outage, an MCI, a hospital 
evacuation, and an improvised explosive device.  
With the frequency of HICS activations ranging from 26 to 34 annually, (an 
average of 29.6 times), a variety of scenarios exercised, and activations for 
planned events in addition to emergencies, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
HICS is the result of a determined commitment to plan, prepare, and train at 
Stanford.  
This chapter described and analyzed Stanford’s adoption of HICS after the 
preceding chapter laid the foundation by describing Stanford’s EMP. These 
chapters provided information that depicted Stanford Medicine’s culture of 
emergency preparedness prior to the next chapter that provides an analysis of 
                                            
119 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster.”  
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the four identified commonalities of the perceived successful implementation of 
HICS and their applicability to Stanford.  
These chapters that precede the case study of Stanford’s response to 
Asiana portray the environment of emergency preparedness at Stanford when 
the crash occurred. An analysis of Stanford’s EMP and adoption of HICS was 
done before the analysis of the case study to provide insight into the readiness of 
Stanford prior to the Asiana MCI.  
The next chapter analyzes the applicability of the four commonalities to 
Stanford Medicine. 
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IV. STEPS OF ANALYSIS I–IV 
In order to determine if the four commonalities identified in the literature 
review are practiced at Stanford, the answers to four questions with sub-
questions were analyzed that correspond with each commonality. Questions and 
more detailed sub-questions were developed from commonalities found in the 
literature. The answers to these questions allow analysis of the applicability and 
practice of the commonalities to Stanford.120 Appendix A, also referenced in 
Chapter I, lists the questions and sub-questions, the answers to which are 
discussed in the following sections: four identified commonalities of the perceived 
successful implementation of HICS and four analyzed answers to questions that 
correspond with each commonality. 
A. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
1. Question 1 
An analysis was conducted of answers to the question “What steps did 
hospital leadership take to implement HICS within a culture of preparedness over 
the past five years?” to assess the first commonality for successful HICS 
implementation: “A firm commitment of hospital executive leadership to 
implement HICS within a culture of preparedness.”  
Notable staff resources are committed to emergency preparedness. As 
discussed and cited in Chapter III, Stanford’s extensive EMP with a fully staffed 
OEM including a full-time administrative director and three additional full-time 
staff suggests executive commitment to this health system’s culture of 
preparedness. A signed policy and delegation formalizes the support of executive 
leadership for the OEM. The four signatories are the chief executive officers and 
chief operating officers for both Stanford Health Care and Stanford Children’s 
Health. An entire four-page section is devoted to Stanford’s administrative and 
                                            
120 These questions and sub-questions in Appendix A were discussed with Patrick Lynch, 
RN of California EMSA and Craig DeAtley, PA-C of Med Star Washington Hospital Center. 
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cultural adoption of HICS in the 57-page EOP. Written verification also 
demonstrates the hospital’s compliance with NIMS, The Joint Commission’s 
emergency management standards and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services emergency management requirements. Oversight is provided to the 
Emergency Management Steering Committee by the Hospital Boards, Medical 
Executive Committees, and Quality Improvement Committees of Stanford 
Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital. Five subcommittees on the 
Emergency Management Steering Committee are named according to specific 
HICS functions or roles that increases the frequency staff use HICS terminology 
to further assist the cultural adoption of HICS. 
As this research did not include staff surveys but a review of 
documentation only, it was not determined how often leadership participates in 
HICS training and exercises. However, the Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2013 
indicates that 165 “managers and above” received HICS training through FEMA’s 
Emergency Management Institute and Stanford has a total of 594 current 
“managers and above” trained in HICS.121 Minimal training requirements for staff 
was not determined but considering the numbers of staff trained in specific 
positions (three in each of the most commonly activated positions), the frequent 
HICS activations ranging from 26–34 annually, and the staff comments about 
frequent training noted in the Asiana after action documentation,122 it seems 
training is sufficient.  
The documentation reviewed did not include budget information. Thus, the 
allocation of financial resources for emergency management was not 
determined, but it is reasonable to assert that Stanford’s financial investment in 
emergency management is substantial in consideration of the personnel 
                                            
121 Stanford Hospital and Clinics, Stanford Hospital and Clinics Emergency Management 
Annual Report FY 2013 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Hospital, 2013), 22. 
122 Stanford Hospitals and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, 2013 SFO Plane 
Crash Mass Casualty Incident After Action Report/Improvement Plan (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
Hospitals and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, 2013).  
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resources allocated, the frequent HICS activations, the extensive preparation of 
the HCC, and the significant logistics observed in the HCC.  
An additional example of this health system’s financial commitment to 
emergency preparedness was observed during a site visit to Stanford when the 
health system was preparing for the potential treatment of Ebola patients. To 
prepare staff effectively for this type of infectious disease, a simulation lab for the 
treatment of Ebola patients was built and developed to allow staff to practice the 
highly specialized medical treatment needed and the use of extensive personal 
protective equipment (PPE). This lab was observed, as well as PPE training. It 
appeared that significant financial resources were allocated to assure this health 
system’s proficient response to this potential public health crisis and possible 
emergency.  
The review of documentation on Box revealed that HICS is not only 
implemented for proclaimed emergencies but for planned events as well, such as 
a planned utility shutdown and a planned IT upgrade. The HICS structure was 
also observed for Ebola preparation.  
Based on the aforementioned answers, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Stanford Medicine demonstrates a firm commitment of hospital executive 
leadership to implement HICS within a culture of preparedness. 
2. Question 2 
Answers to the question “What is the extent of advanced planning with 
community partners that includes training, drills and exercises” were analyzed to 
assess the second commonality for successful HICS implementation: “Advance 
planning with community partners that includes training, drills and exercising.” 
Advance planning with community partners is extensive as determined by 
the review of the EOP. As stated, and cited in Chapter IV, significant 
documentation supports Stanford’s strong integration with community partners. 
The City of Palo Alto where Stanford is located is represented on the Emergency 
Management Steering Committee as is SFO’s Emergency Management Group. 
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Executive leadership’s delegation and policy for the OEM states that the success 
of the OEM is dependent on the active involvement of multiple stakeholders and 
the community. Steering committee representation also includes members from 
the Hospital Councils for Stanford Medical Center, Lucile Packard Children’s 
Hospital, and Stanford University’s Emergency Management Committee. 
The objectives of the City of Palo Alto’s OES are incorporated into 
Stanford’s EOP. Continuity of operations after a disaster are supported by broad 
community and business partnerships that include memoranda of understanding 
with the American Red Cross Bay Area, and hospitals in the county, as well as 
other health systems, such as the Palo Alto Medical Foundation and the Palo 
Alto Veterans’ Health Systems Administration.  
As stated in Chapter IV, Stanford’s OEM program is an active member of 
the City of Palo Alto Emergency Preparedness Task Force and is also 
represented on the Palo Alto/Stanford Citizens’ Corps Council with community 
representatives, such as the City of Palo Alto Police, Fire/EMS, OES, the 
business sector/Chamber of Commerce, Silicon Valley/Red Cross, as well as 
Stanford University. 
The frequency of trainings, drills, and exercises that included community 
partners beyond the annual statewide medical and health exercise could not be 
determined from the review of documentation. However, the City of Palo Alto’s 
homeland security coordinator wrote the AAR for a hospital earthquake exercise 
conducted on November 5, 2009 and included a description of the effective 
“Stanford hospital nexus” to the City of Palo Alto. This person is now the Director 
of Emergency Services for the City of Palo Alto,123 so it seems reasonable to 
believe this relationship remains strong in consideration of the joint activities and 
committees between the Stanford OEM and Palo Alto.  
Stanford far exceeds the two joint commission-required annual exercises 
as indicated in Chapter IV. Exercise participation includes the annual statewide 
                                            
123 The researcher is aware of this person’s position from her day-to-day duties. 
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medical and health exercise coordinated by the California Department of Public 
Health and California EMSA that enables each hospital to determine its own 
objectives with the community with a provided scenario. The Annual Report for 
Fiscal Year 2013 states that 3,142 hospital staff participated in this exercise for 
an earthquake scenario with the community. As discussed in Chapter V, Stanford 
also conducts monthly drills, as well as quarterly unannounced HICS activations 
for a variety of objectives and scenarios. 
In addition, Stanford participates in the regional “Urban Shield” annual 
exercise,124 led by neighboring Alameda County, as well as the annual state 
disaster medical training and exercise led by California EMSA.125 Participating in 
community, regional, and state preparedness exercises appears to be a priority. 
Based on the aforementioned answers, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Stanford Medicine participates in advance planning with community partners that 
includes training, drills, and exercising. 
3. Question 3 
Answers to the question “What are the components of the Hospital 
Command Center’s (HCC) Communication Plan and what are the 
redundancies?” were analyzed to assess the third identified commonality for 
successful HICS implementation “An effective communication plan with 
redundancies for information management.” The communication plan is 
described before its aspects are observed. 
The EOP provides an eight-page communication plan.126 As stated and 
cited in Chapter V, components of the plan are referenced in the separate HCC 
set up guide and further details of the internal and external communication plan 
are provided in the PIO Response Guide. JASs provide instructions to implement 
                                            
124 “Home,” accessed January 11, 2015, http://www.urbanshield.org/.  
125 The researchers is aware of this exercise from her day-to-day duties. The EMSA-led 
exercise is dependent on available funding and will not be held in 2015.  
126 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital (SHC and LPCH), 
Confidential Do Not Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 32–39. 
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the communication plan including how to activate communications systems with 
IT and what information is stored on thumb drives. It would appear that providing 
aspects of the plan in redundant assistive documents would increase the ease of 
implementing the plan, which would theoretically increase the communication 
ability of staff.  
The communication plan calls for participation in a joint information center 
(JIC) with Stanford Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital when 
applicable. Specific documentation that identified the PIO’s participation in a city 
or county JIC was not observed. However, the communication plan did identify 
the role of a Stanford liaison officer at the city or county EOC, and specific details 
are provided on how the HCC would communicate with “external authorities,” 
including local EMS, local and state public health, first responders, patients and 
families, other healthcare organizations, vendors, contractors, alternate care 
sites, and HAM radio communications.127 
Hospital generators provide backup or redundancy for power if a power 
outage occurs, and all technologies in the HCC are also in the Stanford mobile 
communications truck, as observed by the researcher and stored on Stanford’s 
property. The “black box” in this truck also provides a wireless connection. The 
truck provides “a backup for that backup,” which was stated to be vital by 
Brigham & Women’s Hospital personnel after the Boston Marathon.128 
Stanford key personnel also have access to the government emergency 
telecommunications service (GETS) and specific directions are provided to 
obtain said access.129 GETS is an emergency phone service provided by the 
National Communication System that provides emergency access and priority 
processing as a means to overcome network outages.130 
                                            
127 Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital (SHC and LPCH), 
Confidential Do Not Distribute-Emergency Operations Plan, 33, 36–37. 
128 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster,” 2. 
129 SHC and LPCH-Confidential-Do Not Distribute-EOP, 38–39. 
130 Ibid. 
 51 
The communications equipment in the HCC had thorough directions in 
sufficient detail for use of the equipment immediately available so that staff who 
have never been in the HCC could respond at that location and determine how to 
communicate without being told. A hard copy of the communication plan was in 
the HCC, and it is redundantly available on the hospital’s software program, 
“EPIC,” as well as on the Cloud. There are two separate IT networks plus analog. 
Every cabinet containing communications equipment in the HCC is labeled and 
contains photographs of the equipment with specific directions for use. 
The HCC communications closet contains base station radios, handheld 
radios, portable satellite phones and fixed position satellite phones in sufficient 
number for staff to communicate. Photographs illustrate the contents of each 
cabinet and closet in the HCC. A channel guide is in the communications closet, 
as well as in the HCC set up guide. A visual aid with precise directions to operate 
handheld radios and satellite phones is also present in this closet and in the HCC 
set up guide as well. Bay stations that provide communications capability with 
fire, law, and EMS are present. Specific directions on how to communicate if 
landline telephones or satellite phones are not accessible are provided.131  
Conference call instructions are detailed and wireless Internet information 
with passcodes is provided in the HCC. Information on the electronic bed polling 
system, EMSystem’s “EMResource”132 is provided with web addresses, logins 
and passwords, although bed polling is usually completed in the emergency 
department (redundant capability is provided in the HCC). This system can also 
be used to declare interruptions to services to the county emergency medical 
services agency. Information on the internal hospital alerting system is also 
provided, as are instructions on how to mirror an Apple iPhone or iPad onto the 
HCC TV, as well as how to use the mobile wireless hotspots also stored in the 
COMMUNICATIONS CLOSET. 
                                            
131 SHC and LPCH-Confidential-Do Not Distribute-EOP, 33. 
132 “Resources,” accessed December 31, 2014, http://www.emsystems.com/info/ 
emresource.html.  
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Based on the aforementioned answers, it appears reasonable to conclude 
that Stanford Medicine has an effective communication plan with redundancies 
for information management. 
4. Question 4 
Answers to the question “What measures, if any, were taken to modify 
HICS to the individual hospital’s needs as part of the Emergency Management 
Plan and as part of the Asiana response?” were analyzed to assess the fourth 
identified commonality for successful HICS implementation: “The modification of 
HICS to the individual hospital’s or health system’s needs.”  
Several modifications to HICS are notable. The EOP states the standard 
HICS organizational structure has been modified to a command structure that 
coordinates the two separate hospitals in this health system, Stanford Hospital 
and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital.133 Two ICs, one from each facility, are 
present in the HCC, as are two operations chiefs, and two planning chiefs, each 
of whom performs their role for their respective hospital.134  
A “transfer of command” sheet, Appendix E, has been developed to 
enable a smooth transition for the outgoing and incoming IC. This “transfer of 
command” sheet identifies four major steps the ICs must take, as well as a 
briefing checklist that contains 11 components the outgoing and ingoing IC 
should review. The JAS for the IC has two additional tasks that are added at the 
beginning, (1) “stop, take a deep breath, do you have control of the room?,” and 
(2) “have non-essential personnel not assigned leave the HCC.”135 
One additional IRG has been developed from the hospital’s evacuation 
plan, but no other additional IRGs were observed. 
A notable Stanford development is the creation of one page “fast action 
sheets” for HICS positions that contain nine to 11 bullets listing the most 
                                            
133 SHC and LPCH-Confidential-Do Not Distribute-EOP, 38–39, 12. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Incident Commander JAS observed in the HCC on October 28, 2014. 
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important steps staff must take. These fast action sheets are considerably 
shorter, and may be folded in half and fit into pockets, compared to the HICS 
JASs that can be three, or sometimes, four pages.  
“Code triage” is the emergency code Stanford uses for an MCI and Asiana 
constituted an MCI.136 Appendix G illustrates the fast action sheets for the key 
HICS leadership positions related to the implementation of the Asiana code 
triage. It is noted that these fast action sheets also contain a color-coded map 
indicating the location for each of these categorized patients: immediate, 
delayed, minor, etc.  
Stanford modified HICS with the creation of the HICS positions of triage 
unit leader, immediate care team leader, delayed care team leader, minor care 
team leader, pediatric care team leader and expectant care team leader. Only 
the casualty care unit leader is an official HICS position.  
Additional HICS modifications include the naming of HICS positions that 
more closely match the day-to-day titles and duties of staff positions, such as 
security officer, ambulatory branch director, materials manager and engineering 
and maintenance branch director.  
In consideration of the examples of HICS modifications previously noted, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Stanford Medicine has planned and modified 
HICS to meet the specific needs of the health system. 
B. CONCLUSION OF ANALYSIS 
Previous chapters discussed the adoption of HICS within the context of 
Stanford’s comprehensive EMP. This chapter compared the HICS 
implementation at Stanford Medicine to the commonalities of the perceived 
successful implementation of HICS identified from the literature review.  
                                            
136 Stanford uses the SALT triage method, which stands for sort, assess, lifesaving 
interventions, treatment/transport. 
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It is concluded from the analysis that Stanford Medicine demonstrates a 
firm commitment of hospital executive leadership to implement HICS within a 
culture of preparedness, that Stanford participates in advance planning with 
community partners that includes training, drills and exercising, that the 
communication plan is effective with redundancies for information management, 
and that Stanford Medicine modifies HICS to meet the specific needs of the 
health system.  
Based on this conclusion, the commonalities of the perceived successful 
implementation of HICS identified in the literature review are also practiced at 
Stanford Medicine independent of whether HICS is perceived to be successful at 
Stanford.  
These chapters that precede the case study of Stanford’s response to 
Asiana portray the environment of emergency preparedness at Stanford when 
the crash occurred. An analysis of Stanford’s EMP and adoption of HICS was 
done before the analysis of the case study to determine if the four commonalities 
are practiced at Stanford and to provide insight into the readiness of Stanford 
prior to the Asiana MCI.  
The next chapter introduces the scenario of Asiana and Stanford’s 
response. Stanford’s preparedness prior to Asiana may be comparable to that of 
Boston’s hospitals prior to the Boston Marathon bombings described in Chapter I. 
From the available information about Boston, it appears that both health systems’ 
implemented HICS within a culture of preparedness, conducted advance 
planning with community partners, had effective communication plans with 
redundant measures, and modified HICS to meet the needs of the health 
systems. 
In consideration of Stanford’s practice of the four commonalities, including 
extensive measures of preparedness and cultural adoption of HICS, it is 
reasonable to theorize that Stanford personnel would perceive HICS to be 
successful in response to Asiana as Boston personnel perceived HICS to be 
successful. The next chapter discusses the testing of this hypothesis. 
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF HICS SUCCESS DURING ASIANA AND 
STANFORD’S RESPONSE 
This chapter describes Asiana from the perspective of the medical 
response. Stanford Medicine’s response is also discussed and analyzed. This 
plane crash constituted an MCI for Stanford in that it received 55 patients from 
the crash. The previous chapter concluded that the four identified commonalities 
independent of the perceived successful implementation of HICS are applicable 
to Stanford Medicine. Theoretically, it would indicate that the implementation of 
HICS for Stanford’s response to this incident would be perceived as successful. 
As part of this case study, the researcher further assesses applicability of the 
four commonalities, and tests the hypothesis that the four commonalities will lead 
to the perceived success of HICS implementation.  
The perceived success of HICS is measured by statements of hospital 
personnel indicating such, e.g., “HICS worked” as was the case in response to 
the Northridge earthquake and the Boston Marathon bombings cited in Chapter I. 
A. THE ASIANA PLANE CRASH  
On Saturday July 6, 2013, at 11:27 am, Asiana Airlines Flight 214 crashed 
upon landing at SFO (Figure 2).137 
                                            
137 Kevin Rose, “From Chaos to Coordination: The EMS Patient Movement Strategy for the 
Asiana Plane Crash,” California Hospital Association’s Disaster Planning for California Hospitals 
Conference, presentation and PowerPoint by Interim Medical Health Operational Area 
Coordinator (MHOAC), San Mateo County EMS Agency, September 24, 2014. 
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Figure 2.  This Aerial Photo Shows the Wreckage of Asiana Flight 214 
after It Crashed July 6, 2013, at SFO138  
The loss of the airplane tail and other parts of the plane caused a trail of 
airplane debris with a debris field that measured more than eight football fields in 
length from the sea wall to the aircraft’s resting site.139 Jet fuel was leaking along 
with aircraft lavatory waste and luggage was exposed.140 Chutes imploded on 
the right side of the plane and 307 people were dispersed from the sea wall to 
the crash site, including 291 passengers and 16 members of the flight crew.141 
Two were dead on scene, and four crew members and two passengers were 
ejected during the crash.142 The explosion and subsequent fire occurred after the 
casualty collection point was set up on the tarmac.143 
SFO is geographically located in San Mateo County, and therefore, the 
San Mateo County EMS agency has jurisdiction and authority to coordinate the 
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movement of patients from the scene.144 This EMS agency implemented its multi 
casualty incident plan and trauma plan, which resulted in three hospitals that are 
also Trauma Centers receiving a total of 110 trauma patients. Fifty-five trauma 
patients were transported to Stanford Hospital, 53 were transported to San 
Francisco General Hospital and two were transported to Eden Medical Center.145 
In total, 181 patients were transported to 11 hospitals within five hours in three to 
four waves with resources that included 52 transport ambulances, four air 
ambulances, and two buses.146  
A more comprehensive description of the incident that extends beyond the 
medical response may be accessed at USA Today.147 This on-line article 
provides details regarding the flight path of the Boeing 777 with multiple photos 
of the crash site, as well as a video of the National Transportation Safety Board 
representative announcing the investigation of the crash. 
B. STANFORD’S RESPONSE 
The flow of incoming patients and the activation of HICS is described as 
follows. 
At 11:40 am, the San Mateo County EMS Agency issued a bed query 
through EMSystems’ EMResource, the Internet-based bed polling application,148 
regarding a MCI.149 The initial code triage standby page was activated at 12:06 
by the emergency department, which alerted staff to standby for a possible MCI 
after media reports of the crash were observed by a nurse on the television in the 
                                            




147 William M. Welch, John Swartz, and Gary Strauss, “Two Dead, 168 Hurt in San 
Francisco Air Crash,” USA Today, July 6, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/ 
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149 Stanford Hospitals and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, 2013 SFO Plane 
Crash Mass Casualty Incident After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 6. 
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patient waiting area.150 The first two patients arrived on scene at 12:40 via a U.S. 
Coast Guard helicopter.151 At 12:43, the San Mateo County EMS agency notified 
the emergency department that four patients were en route, which was the 
trigger for the decision to be made to initiate code triage major, the code for an 
MCI, and activate the HCC.152 The HCC was activated at 12:46 when the code 
triage major page was sent to notify staff of the SFO plane crash.153 By 1:15 pm, 
29 minutes later, the joint Stanford Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s 
Hospital HCC located at Stanford Hospital was fully activated with all HICS 
positions filled and the triage area readied (Figure 3).154 
 
Figure 3.  Teams Await the Arrival of the Crash Victims at Stanford’s 
Emergency Department on July 6, 2013155  
An exact timeline for the arrival of each patient was not determined. 
However, the documentation reviewed indicates patients were received in waves 
throughout the afternoon (Figure 4). At 3:35 pm, an additional eight patients were 
inbound to the emergency department, and by 4:30 pm, a total of 35 patients 
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155 “This Is Not a Test: In Caring for Airplane Crash Victims, Training and Teamwork, 
Prevailed.” Photo courtesy of Brandon Bond. 
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were in the emergency department. The last 7 patients arrived at 6:27 pm, which 
brought the total numbers of patients seen at both hospitals on July 6 to 55.156  
 
Figure 4.  The First Ambulance Arrives at Stanford157  
Guest services worked with the City of Palo Alto and the American Red 
Cross to assist with family reunification.158 Guest services also coordinated the 
multitude of outside agencies that arrived including Homeland Security 
Investigations, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Customs and Border 
Patrol.159 The Custom and Border Patrol officials on site asked that all patients 
remain secure and not be discharged.160  
Records indicate at 6:40 pm, patients discharged from the emergency 
department were housed and supported until they were allowed to be released 
and transportation was arranged to return them to SFO.161 At 7:03 pm, 
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161 “This Is Not a Test: In Caring for Airplane Crash Victims, Training and Teamwork, 
Prevailed.” 
 60 
discharged patients began being transported back to SFO with coordination from 
security services.162  
An HCC brief and update was given at 7:15 pm, and a press conference 
was held at 7:30 pm with Stanford Hospital and the Palo Alto Police Department. 
At 8:12 pm, the code triage major was paged “all clear,” which indicates most 
patients had been triaged and were either admitted to the hospital, discharged 
but securely held before release, or transported back to SFO (only patients 
triaged as “minor” remained in the emergency department).163 By 8:45 pm, much 
of the HCC was broken down and all paperwork was processed and signed, and 
at 1:30 am, on July 7, the HCC was officially closed.164 Final patient numbers 
indicate 55 patients were received with 11 admitted to Stanford Hospital and 
seven admitted to Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital.165  
A modified HCC was opened at 10:00 am on July 7 with scaled down 
staffing, and Asiana Airlines and Chinese Consulate representatives arrived at 
the hospital.166 By 12:45 pm, a communication was sent to all staff directing them 
to refer any third parties requesting information concerning patients to the 
administrator on call.167 
One additional patient arrived on July 7 totaling 56 patients in all received 
from Asiana.168 By 6:28 pm on July 7, all seven children admitted to the 
Children’s Hospital were discharged and one patient was discharged from 
Stanford Hospital.169 
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The previous description indicates that HICS was quickly activated when 
Stanford was notified that patients were incoming from the scene of the plane 
crash, and the HCC was fully activated with all HICS positions filled in less than 
30 minutes. This HCC activation occurred very quickly, in the researcher’s 
opinion. 
C. DOCUMENT REVIEW  
After concluding that the four commonalities for successful HICS 
implementation identified in the literature review were practiced at Stanford, it 
was hypothesized that the HICS implementation for Asiana should be perceived 
to be successful by Stanford personnel. To test this hypothesis, a review was 
conducted of all documentation with the focus of identifying comments, positive 
or negative, relative to HICS. Comments not directly related to HICS were not 
considered relevant.  
In response to the request to review all documentation from the Asiana 
response, OEM Administrative Director Brandon Bond provided the following 
documents: the 40-page Stanford Hospital and Lucile Packard Children’s 
Hospital AAR, 26 “debrief data collection forms,” 12 “debrief emails,”170 the IAP, 
the HCC sign-in sheet; HICS forms; and JASs.  
Appendix J provides a detailed description of the Asiana after action 
documentation review. 
Two Stanford newsletter articles were reviewed from July 8, 2013, and 
July 15, 2013,171 and one July 12, 2013. A Los Angeles Times article was 
reviewed about Stanford’s response to Asiana, all of which support the 
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commonalities in the HICS implementation model that Stanford was well 
prepared due to advance planning, training, drilling, and exercising.172  
The debrief data collection forms and the debrief emails appear to be the 
building blocks for the AAR (along with the comments provided at the after action 
review meetings). Twenty-six data collection forms and 12 emails were reviewed 
with the focus of identifying comments, positive or negative, relative to HICS. 
 No positive comments directly related to HICS on the data 
collection forms and emails 
Although 60 comments related to individual and team performance, and 
the efficiency of the HCC, the data collection forms and emails did not contain 
positive comments directly related to HICS.  
 Two negative comments directly related to HICS were written by 
one person on a data collection form173 
The HICS Job Action Plans are not as clear as they could be and 
appear more complex than necessary. There is also no Job Action 
Plan for a mass casualty event!174  
 One positive comment directly related to HICS in the AAR 
One observation under the communication element on the AAR 
was a strength directly related to HICS: 
Information traveled through appropriate HICS channels, both in 
terms of going up to the HCC and back down. The established 
HICS processes and procedures worked.175 
 No negative comments directly related to HICS in the AAR 
The AAR did not contain negative comments directly relevant to HICS.  
                                            
172 Kate Mather, “Asiana Plane Crash: A Stanford Hospital’s Disaster Drill Paid Off,” Los 
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173 The researcher is not able to state the position of the commenter, as it could be possible 
to determine the identity of the person, which violates rules of the Department of the Navy. 
174 Debrief Data Collection Form. 
175 Stanford Hospitals and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, 2013 SFO Plane 
Crash Mass Casualty Incident After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 12. 
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VI. FINDINGS 
This research was initiated because of the paucity of research done on the 
implementation of HICS. The impact of HICS, positive or negative, has not been 
comprehensively studied, and implementation of the system seems to be limited 
to anecdotal examples. It could be argued that this thesis represents another 
anecdotal example; however, the detailed review of a hospital or health system’s 
emergency management program was not part of any of the anecdotes 
previously described. In addition, none of the anecdotes tested a hypothesis.  
Every hospital in Boston used HICS in response to the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombings, and anecdotes from two online articles about this response 
touted the benefits of HICS, “HICS worked.”176 However, prior to this incident, 
the most compelling documentation available on the value of HICS for an 
emergency response in the United States was from a survey conducted at 
Northridge Hospital after the 1994 Northridge earthquake in which HICS was 
cited as a major reason for the hospital’s successful response.177 An article from 
Taiwan stated the apparent value of a modified HICS in response to the SARS 
outbreak of 2003 as determined by a staff survey.178  
While publications about HICS implementation are not extensive, a 
literature review revealed four commonalities that support the perceived 
successful implementation of HICS. In addition to the Boston and Northridge 
examples, a California health system’s CEO and 40 stakeholders from the “2011 
HICS National Summit” also provided feedback as did journal articles including 
those describing international use.  
 
                                            
176 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster.” 
177 Lowder, “The Day the Earth Moved,” 32–3  
178 “National Cheng Kung University Hospital, Taiwan; Hospital Emergency Incident 
Command System Implemented during SARS Outbreak.”  
 64 
As a result, it can be concluded that four commonalities support the 
perceived successful implementation of HICS. 
 A firm commitment of hospital executive leadership to implement 
HICS within a culture of preparedness.  
 Advance planning with community partners that includes training, 
drills, and exercising. 
 An effective communication plan with redundancies for information 
management. 
 The modification of HICS to the individual hospital’s or health 
system’s needs. 
However, these four commonalities may not be granular enough for future 
evaluations. For example, “advance planning with community partners that 
includes training, drills and exercising” may be further delineated for future 
analyses into the four categories of planning, training, exercising, and 
coordinating with external/community partners. 
A comprehensive analysis of the documentation relative to Stanford’s 
EMP with an emphasis on Stanford’s cultural adoption of HICS determined that 
these four commonalities are practiced at Stanford. The review and analysis 
included data from the five years that preceded Asiana, the OEM governance 
structure, integration with the community, frequency of HICS activations, a robust 
communication plan and redundant communications resources, and 
modifications to HICS.  
After it was determined that the four commonalities are practiced at 
Stanford, it was hypothesized that Stanford personnel would perceive HICS to be 
successful in response to the Asiana crash. Extensive after action documentation 
from the Asiana response was analyzed to test this hypothesis.  
The researcher’s finding is that HICS was perceived to be successful in 
the area of supporting effective communication, when considering the statements 
from the AAR: “Information traveled through appropriate HICS channels, both in 
terms of going up to the HCC and back down. The established HICS processes 
and procedures worked.”  
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Based on the aforementioned comments, the tested hypothesis was found 
to be supported in that HICS was perceived to be successful in promoting 
effective communication. 
A. ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM THE ASIANA CRASH RESPONSE 
Since this research addresses the performance of HICS and not the 
performance of Stanford, the focus of the documentation review was specific to 
HICS. The review of the debrief data collection forms and emails revealed no 
positive comments directly related to HICS and two negative comments directly 
related to HICS made by one individual. The review of the AAR revealed one 
positive comment directly related to HICS and no negative comments directly 
related to HICS. 
It is notable that the two negative comments the researcher observed on 
the one data collection form were not mentioned in the 40-page AAR, possibly 
because the comments were an outlier among an abundance of positive general 
input about non-HICS issues. The same person who made the negative 
comments about HICS also stated positive comments about the outstanding 
performance of staff and the professional management of the response. It 
appears the person’s complaint did not negatively affect her perception of the 
response but reflected her opinion about HICS. 
It is possible the individual who made the negative comments was not 
among the most trained in HICS. The descriptions made are not consistent with 
correct HICS terminology, although it does not invalidate the comments made. 
The staff member refers to the HICS “job action plan” when the term is actually 
job action sheet. However, the remark that these assistive documents are “not as 
clear as they could be and appear more complex than necessary” may be a valid 
point. The JASs vary in length from three to four pages, and also contain the 
documents or forms the position may benefit from using. It is possible the OEM 
administrative director may agree that the JASs are more complex than 
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necessary, as he created the one page fast action sheet that contains the most 
important nine to 11 action steps.  
The comment that “there is also no job action plan for a mass casualty 
event” also reflects incorrect HICS terminology as job action sheets are for 
positions, not events or scenarios. IPGs and IRGs are developed for incidents or 
scenarios. This confusion of precise terminology seems to be a minor detail, and 
it is a valid point that the Fourth Edition of HICS did not contain an IPG or IRG for 
an MCI.  
The AAR also contained information that extended beyond the debrief 
data collection forms and emails and incorporated the comprehensive input of 
the 125 staff who participated in the three different after action/debrief meetings. 
Based on this input, the two negative comments on the data collection sheet may 
have seemed irrelevant.  
The theory that the feedback of 125 staff was more comprehensive than 
the data collection forms and emails could also explain why not one positive 
comment was directly related to HICS on the data collection forms and emails, 
but one positive comment and strength of the response attributed to HICS was 
cited in the AAR.  
Without conducting staff interviews, it is not possible to analyze with 
certainty why the one negative comment was not included in the AAR, and why 
the positive comment in the AAR was not noted in the data collection forms and 
emails reviewed. 
It does appear, however, that the implemented HICS processes and 
procedures were effective in maintaining clear communication among HIMT 
personnel, as it was noted as a strength of the response in the AAR, which 
summarized the feedback of 125 staff and extended beyond the data collection 
forms and emails. 
Even though this study did not consider feedback not directly related to 
HICS to be relevant, significant documentation described a high level of 
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individual and team proficiency of Stanford personnel in responding to this 
incident. It is apparent from the debrief data collection sheets and emails that 
highly competent individuals and a cohesive HIMT were significant factors that 
led to Stanford’s success.  
Of the 26 debrief data collection sheets reviewed, 29 specific comments 
cited individual or team competence. Of the 12 debrief emails reviewed, 31 cited 
individual or team competence. 
Even the one staff member who made the two negative comments 
preceded those with the positive remarks that succinctly summarize those of 
Stanford colleagues: 
Very well organized, calm, professionally managed, coordinated, 
outstanding work by all.179 
The data from Asiana further supported the conclusion that Stanford 
practices the four commonalities, specifically a cultural of emergency 
preparedness and adoption of HICS and advance planning with frequent 
exercises. Staff comments on data sheets and debrief emails included 
statements, such as “prep work was working in the HCC,” “it was apparent that 
staff training and prep work had been done in advance,” “staff felt ready to act 
due to the recent drill,” “I was impressed with how confident everyone was and 
how quickly the whole area was cordoned off,” and “everyone knew what to do 
and stayed calm.”180 
The opening paragraph in the July 8th Stanford Newsletter states “Years 
of disaster training and preparation culminated in an extraordinarily executed 
response July 6 when 55 injured passengers were brought to Stanford Hospital 
and Lucille Packard Children’s Hospital.”181 OEM Administrative Director 
                                            
179 Debrief Data Collection Form. 
180 A sampling of comments taken from the debrief data collection sheets and debrief emails. 
(these were not counted or considered to be citing individual or team performance) 
181 “When Plane-crash Victims Arrived at Stanford Medicine, Response Teams Were 
Ready.” 
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Brandon Bond is quoted as saying “The many hours we devote to disaster 
planning and training really paid off.”182 The researcher’s review of Stanford’s 
comprehensive EMP, including a review of five years of documents related to 
emergency preparedness and response that preceded Asiana, support these 
statements.  
Dr. Robert Norris, Stanford’s Chief of Emergency Medicine, is quoted in 
the Los Angeles Times’ July 12, 2013, article, “To Be Honest with You, It Was a 
Phenomenal Test of Our System.” The key to this is being practiced at it and 
drilling. If you try to adopt a plan or hope that a plan that is completely alien to 
your staff will work, it won’t.”183 It is reminiscent of Dr. Alisdair Conn, Chief of 
Emergency Services at Massachusetts General Hospital after the Boston 
Marathon Bombings, who cited training and repeated disaster drills as making 
the primary difference in his hospital’s success.184  
The analysis of data further supported Stanford’s culture of preparedness 
and revealed that HICS was perceived to be successful in promoting effective 
communication during the Asiana response, and individual and team 
competence were considered to be significant factors that contributed to 
Stanford’s success.  
One of the two negative comments made about HICS were addressed in 
the release of the Fifth Edition discussed as follows. 
B. HICS FIFTH EDITION  
The Fifth Edition of HICS released in May 2014 provided an IPG and an 
IRG for an MCI; thereby, addressing the negative comment noted on the debrief 
data collection sheet that no such documents existed for the Asiana response.185  
                                            
182 Ibid. 
183 Mather, “Asiana Plane Crash: A Stanford Hospital’s Disaster Drill Paid Off.”  
184 Tomsho, “Training Made the Difference in MGH Preparedness for Marathon Tragedy.” 
185 It was not causal because the documentation review was conducted after the release of 
HICS, Fifth Edition. 
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Appendix H, Incident Planning Guide: Mass Casualty Incident, and 
Appendix I, Incident Response Guide: Mass Casualty Incident, represent these 
assistive tools noted to be lacking for Asiana.186 
Noting this information about the Fifth Edition could be attributed to bias 
on the part of the researcher because it is tantamount to citing a corrective action 
for a weakness attributed to HICS. Since the researcher’s relationship to HICS 
was previously described in Chapter I, no argument is offered to counter this 
potential claim. It is not possible to predict if another researcher would have 
included this information or considered it notable. 
                                            
186 As a peripheral issue, the Fifth Edition of HICS also addresses a comment not specific to 
Stanford but relative to the Asiana response. During Kevin Rose’s presentation at the September 
2014 California Hospital Association Conference cited in “Section X: From Chaos to Coordination: 
The EMS Patient Movement Strategy for the Asiana Plane Crash,” Mr. Rose of the San Mateo 
County EMS agency made a general statement that the hospitals that received the patients from 
Asiana would have been better positioned to address patient family needs during the response 
with the new Patient Family Assistance Branch added under the Operations Section in the Fifth 
HICS Edition released in May 2014. The Patient Family Assistance Branch organizes and 
manages the delivery of assistance to meet patient family care needs, including communication, 
lodging, food, health care, and spiritual and emotional needs that arise during the incident 
including family reunification. “Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) 2014—Job Action 
Sheet—Operations Section,” http://www.emsa.ca.gov/hospital_incident_command_sys 
tem_job_action_sheets_2014_Operations.  
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VII. CONCLUSION  
The study began as a test of a hypothesis that successful HICS 
implementation is dependent on the four commonalities identified in the literature. 
These four commonalities are: (1) a firm commitment of hospital executive 
leadership to implement HICS within a culture of preparedness, (2) advanced 
planning with community partners that includes training, drills, and exercising, (3) 
an effective communication plan with redundancies for information management, 
and (4) the modification of HICS to the individual hospital’s or health system’s 
needs. 
An analysis was conducted of Stanford’s EMP, OEM governance 
structure, integration with the community, frequency of HICS activations ranging 
from 26–34 annually for the five years that preceded Asiana, the robust 
communication plan with redundant communications resources, and several 
modifications to HICS. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that Stanford 
Medicine practices or demonstrates the four commonalities suggested as critical 
factors during HICS implementation, which was before the after action 
documentation about Stanford’s response to Asiana was reviewed.  
This research then evolved into testing a hypothesis that the practice of 
the four commonalities would result in the perceived successful implementation 
of HICS. Specifically, since Stanford demonstrated the four commonalities, staff 
would perceive the implementation of HICS to be successful in response to 
Asiana, as hospital personnel did after the Boston Marathon bombings and the 
Northridge earthquake. The perception of successful HICS implementation was 
measured by staff statements indicating such, e.g., “HICS worked” as was stated 
after the Boston response. After the Northridge response, HICS “not only 
worked….it was a major reason the hospital could effectively respond…providing 
care to 1400 victims” as a conclusion from a staff survey cited in Chapter I. 
Extensive after action documentation from the Asiana response was 
reviewed and analyzed,which included the 40-page Stanford Hospital and Lucile 
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Packard Children’s Hospital AAR, 26 “debrief data collection forms,” 12 “debrief 
emails,” the IAP, the HCC sign-in sheet, HICS forms, JASs, two Stanford 
newsletter articles, and an article from the Los Angeles Times.  
The AAR expanded upon the comment from Boston that “HICS worked” 
and specified under the category of communication: 
Information traveled through appropriate HICS channels, both in 
terms of going up to the HCC and back down. The established 
HICS processes and procedures worked. 
This statement supports the tested hypothesis that the four commonalities 
led to the perceived successful implementation of HICS. In this case, HICS was 
specifically attributed to promoting effective communication.  
The AAR further supported Stanford’s practice of the four commonalities 
identified in the literature review for successful HICS implementation, especially, 
the culture of preparedness and cultural adoption of HICS and frequent HICS 
activations, as demonstrated by written staff comments citing such.  
Stanford’s executive leadership has committed significant resources to a 
robust EMP that contains four full-time staff. A signed policy and delegation 
formalizes the full support of executive leadership for the OEM. Written support 
of HICS is clear in the 57-page EOP in which an entire section is devoted to 
Stanford’s administrative and cultural adoption of HICS. HICS activations range 
from 26–34 annually including those for unannounced quarterly drills. HICS 
implementation is a way of life at Stanford.  
Advanced planning with community partners is extensive as determined 
by the review of the EOP. The City of Palo Alto where Stanford is located is 
represented on the Emergency Managment Steering Committee as is SFO’s 
Emergency Management Group. The objectives of the City of Palo Alto’s OEM 
are incorporated into Stanford’s EOP, and Stanford’s OEM program is an active 
member of the City of Palo Alto Emergency Preparedness Task Force. Broad 
community and business partnerships support Stanford’s continuity of 
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operations. In addition, the researcher has directly observed Stanford’s 
participation in community, regional, and state-level exercises. 
The communications plan contains redundancies that include a mobile 
communications truck with all technologies contained in the HCC. The 
communication plan is in the EOP and further details are contained in the HCC 
set up guide, as well as the PIO response guide.This plan is available in the 
HCC, on the hospital’s software program, as well as on the Cloud. Every cabinet 
containing communications equipment in the HCC is labeled and contains 
photographs of the equipment with specific directions for use. An ample 
collection of handheld radios, portable satellite phones, fixed position satellite 
phones, and bay stations that provide redundant communications capability with 
fire, law, and EMS, are among the communications equipment stored in the HCC 
that are sufficient in number for staff to communicate. 
Stanford’s modifications to HICS include adding two practical steps to the 
JAS for the IC, creating an IRG developed from the hospital’s evacuation plan, 
creating one page “fast action sheets” that communicate the most important 
steps staff should take and creating additional HICS positions below the casualty 
care unit leader for the implementation of triage. Stanford also developed a 
“transfer of command sheet” for ICs to use when transitioning command during a 
change of shift. Additional HICS positions are named that more closely match the 
titles and duties of staff during non-emergency times. The researcher observed 
the Stanford-named HICS positions of security officer, ambulatory branch 
director, materials manager, and engineering and maintenance director. (These 
positions that reflect day-to-day operations were intentionally left off of the HIMT 
chart as cited in Chapter IV.) 
One individual made two negative comments about HICS on the Asiana 
debrief data collection sheets. The negative comment regarding the unnecessary 
complexity of the JAS may be addressed with the development of fast action 
sheets, and the complaint that HICS did not include specific assistance for an 
MCI was addressed with the 2014 release of the Fifth Edition of HICS, which 
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included an Incident Planning Guide: Mass Casualty Incident (Appendix H) and 
an Incident Response Guide: Mass Casualty Incident (Appendix I). 
This study was limited to an analysis of written documentation and did not 
include human subjects or staff surveys. It seems additional information directly 
relevant to HICS would have been obtained if human subjects were included in 
the research. 
The researcher’s relationship to HICS as the coordinator of the Fourth 
Edition and executive sponsor of the Fifth Edition was identified as a sensitivity 
for this study. Potential bias was acknowledged and objectivity was endeavored. 
It was a challenge to be limited to the review of documentation only after 
communicating with hospital personnel from around the country for the past 10 
years, as well as internationally, and having the ability to ask questions about 
experiences with HICS. 
Another limitation for this thesis is the pre-determined excellence of 
Stanford as the selected hospital for study. Hospitals with less resources may 
have difficulty replicating the findings that led to Stanford’s success. 
In consideration of the high volume of comments, 60 in total, citing 
individual and team competence; it is apparent that highly competent individuals 
and a cohesive HIMT were significant factors that enabled Stanford’s proficiency.  
In addition to the lessons learned that support the tested 
hypothesis, the documentation reviewed described highly 
competent individuals and cohesive teamwork. The researcher is 
not able to separate individual and team competence from the 
tested hypothesis. 
It is possible that the cultural embrace of HICS and the frequent HICS 
activations fostered the competence and teamwork for this response. Staff 
comments included statements, such as “prep work was working in the HCC,” “it 
was apparent that staff training and prep work had been done in advance,” “staff 
felt ready to act due to the recent drill” and congratulatory remarks to the OEM on 
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the “superb response” that included expressions of gratitude “thanks to your 
efforts in preparing all of us, everyone knew what to do and stayed calm.”187 
Although staff are highly competent and function well as a team, it 
appears that HICS provided a structure for staff to excel. This perception is 
based on the statement in the AAR that stated the HICS processes and 
procedures worked after referencing the HICS organizational structure of 
communication channels of going up to the HCC and back down (to where 
patient care was provided). It also appears that the frequency of HICS activations 
reinforced this structure based on the staff references to frequent trainings and 
exercises in the AAR and the HICS activations ranging from 26–34 annually 
including quarterly unannounced drills.  
The one staff member who made the two negative comments about HICS 
preceded those with the positive remarks that succinctly summarize those of 
Stanford colleagues: 
Very well organized, calm, professionally managed, coordinated, 
outstanding work by all.188 
This case study supports this assessment. 
                                            
187 A sampling of comments taken from the debrief data collection sheets and debrief emails. 
188 Debrief data collection form. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS  
As a result of analyzing the data from Stanford, it is recommended that the 
four commonalilties or critical factors for further hypothesis testing be subdivided 
in six areas for further evaluation. This delineation will provide greater specificity 
for future analysis. 
 Executive and administrative support 
 Planning and tailoring (includes modifying HICS) 
 Training and retraining 
 HICS activations and exercises 
 Communication 
 Coordination with community/external partners 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USERS OF HICS 
Many hospitals in California and across the nation may successfully 
implement HICS and do not need recommendations for doing so. Nonetheless, 
based upon lessons learned from Stanford, the following recommendations are 
offered for consideration as a potential predictor of successful HICS 
implementation. It is suggested the six critical factors form the foundation for 
effective implementation of HICS and provide a HICS Implementation Model:  
1. Executive and Administrative Support 
Engage executive leadership to the greatest extent possible in HICS 
activations. Unlike Stanford, this may be challenging for certain hospitals. While 
recruiting executives to fill HICS roles during exercises may be too ambitious for 
some, using the IPGs for discussions on an executive staff meeting agenda may 
be a good starting place. Providing Appendix F to executives that shows the 
potential candidates for HICS command positions along with providing 
accompanying JASs may also be a good starting place. Stanford’s example of 
naming subcommittees of the emergency management steering committee after 
HICS functions/roles, i.e., logistics, operations, planning, and finance seems to 
work well. 
 78 
2. Planning and Tailoring 
Planning and tailoring or modifying HICS to meet the individual needs of 
the hospital or health system is important. Identify an emergency program 
coordinator or planning coordinator. Include HICS in hospital policies and 
procedures. Smaller or rural hospitals may only activate a few HICS positions 
and staff may assume multiple HICS roles; therefore, modify the JAS 
accordingly. Develop an HCC set up guide with specific step-by-step instructions 
with photographs that illustrate how to open and activate the HCC. Identify at 
least three staff who may fill each of the key HIMT roles and include this 
information in the HCC set up guide. Even if the hospital is in the position to train, 
drill, and exercise frequently, have “just-in-time” aids in the HCC including hard 
copies of JASs, IPGs, and IRGs. Create new IPGs or IRGs as Stanford did 
based upon their evacuation plan. Develop additional HICS positions, as 
Tainan’s University Hospital did for SARS, and as Stanford did for triage. Name 
HICS positions that more closely match the titles and duties of staff during non-
emergency times. Stanford examples include security officer, ambulatory branch 
director, materials manager, and engineering and maintenance director.  
Stock the HCC with white boards, easels and flips charts to facilitate 
planning that includes IAP. In addition to having HICS forms on the hospital’s 
electronic health record software, maintain hard copies of all HICS forms in the 
HCC. Enlarge and post representations of key HICS forms, such as the HIMT 
organizational chart and the HICS 202, IAP. Post all briefings and meeting times 
in a prominent place. 
Maintain all emergency planning and response documents on a secure file 
sharing service that offers cloud storage to enable executive leadership, 
community partners and other selected entities to view and/or collaborate on 
documents. Box appears to work well for Stanford. 
Incorporate Stanford’s “transfer of command sheet” to HICS documents to 
facilitate a smooth transition during a change of shift for ICs. (See Appendix E) 
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3. Training and Retraining 
Training and retraining HICS is essential, especially for command and 
general staff positions. The review of JASs and IPGs during staff meetings may 
be helpful as a means to sustain HICS knowledge between trainings or 
exercises.  
4. Activations and Exercises 
Implement HICS for planned events, not only for emergencies. ICS 
principles are applicable for any event that requires organization, such as a 
hospital picnic or party, or any planned disruption of hospital services or routine, 
e.g., utility change or moving patients to a new tower. When planning an 
exercise, use a separate HICS structure for the planning and conduct of the 
exercise. For example, the exercise director would be the incident commander, 
the person responsible for exercise logistics would be the logistics chief, etc. This 
implementation can be done for planned events or exercises of any scale to 
reinforce the responsibilities of the HICS positions and practice the concepts. 
5. Communication 
Test the redundancies of the communication plan including the testing of 
generators and confirm “a backup for the backup.”189 Not all hospitals have a 
mobile communications vehicle that contains the same communications 
capability of the HCC, but test the identified redundancies that include low 
technology in the event technology fails. Since hospital personnel typically do not 
use handheld radios, satellite phones or other auxiliary communications on a 
regular basis, provide regular opportunities for practice, such as communications 
drills, and have photographs of communications equipment with precise step-by-
step directions for operation that may be used on a just-in-time basis. Document 
how the hospital will participate in the city or county JIC in the communication 
plan and practice this plan. Have a hard copy of the communication plan in the 
                                            
189 Goralnick and Walls, “Leading through a Disaster,” 2. 
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HCC that contains conference call instructions, wireless Internet instructions, and 
a floor plan that illustrates the location of specific jacks for VoIP phones and 
analog phones that correlate with the applicable HICS position and phone 
number. In addition, maintain the communication plan in redundant locations, 
including on the hospital’s software program, as well as in cloud storage.  
6. Coordination with Community/External Partners 
Conduct advanced planning with community partners to the greatest 
extent possible that includes training, drills and exercising. Develop strong 
relationships with local government including fire, law, and EMS, as well as non-
governmental entities, such as local business and Red Cross chapters. Include 
these partners on emergency preparedness committees and participate in such 
committees in the community. Review the HVA with community partners on at 
least an annual basis. Incorporate the emergency management objectives of the 
city and/or county into the hospital EOP. Determine with local government 
partners how the hospital will participate in a multi-agency coordination system 
and document this information in the EOP. Develop contracts or memoranda of 
understanding with neighboring hospitals or health systems, non-governmental 
organizations, and vendors to support continuity of operations after a disaster. 
Participate in healthcare coalitions as defined by jurisdictions. Participate in as 
many community, regional, and state-level exercises as possible.  
These six critical factors form a HICS implementation model and comprise 
Appendix K.190 Use Appendix K as an after action survey of the HICS 
implementation model as an evaluation tool and consider forwarding it to 
California EMSA for future research. 
The Fifth Edition of HICS may be accessed on California EMSA’s website 
for more information at www.emsa.ca.gov. 
                                            
190 Appendix K was developed in consultation with Mr. Dan Smiley of the California 
Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) and was reviewed by Mr. Patrick Lynch, RN also 
of California EMSA. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE REVISIONS OF HICS 
Add the HICS implementation model in Appendix K to the next edition of 
HICS to test this model further as a predictor of successful HICS implementation. 
It is recommended that a number of the modifications to HICS developed 
by Stanford be incorporated into the next version to include the following. 
 Add two additional tasks at the beginning to the JAS for the IC: 1. 
“Stop, take a deep breath, do you have control of the room?” and 2. 
“Have non-essential personnel not assigned leave the HCC.” These 
are practical steps that add value to this assistive tool. 
Add the “transfer of command sheet” to the HICS forms. This optional 
form would enable a smooth transition between the outgoing IC and incoming IC 
during a change of shift briefing. 
Develop “fast action sheets” or use Stanford’s as a baseline to develop 
these one page documents that contain the top nine to 11 most important action 
steps HIMT members must take. These sheets may be folded in half and 
laminated and are less complicated than the JASs. The JASs appear to still have 
value but are three to four pages in length and may overwhelm some personnel 
as they appeared to do for one individual during the Asiana response. 
Suggest Appendix K be sent to California EMSA for consideration of 
changes to future HICS editions and to provide data for future research.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This single case study was limited to the review of documentation and did 
not include staff interviews or staff surveys. Six critical factors were identified 
from the tested hypothesis that was supported by the implementation of HICS by 
Stanford Medicine. These six factors form a HICS implementation model. 
surveys of the HICS implementation model identified in Appendix K should be 
collected to further analyze case studies of HICS implementation and the 
perceived success of HICS during an actual event. 
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D. APPENDICES 
 Appendix A: Steps of Analysis I–IV 
 Appendix B: HIMT Organization Chart (fillable version) 
 Appendix C: HICS Job Action Sheet Example: Incident Commander 
Job Action Sheet 
 Appendix D: Stanford Governance Structure for the Office of 
Emergency Management (OEM)  
 Appendix E: Transfer of Command Sheet developed by Stanford  
 Appendix F: Potential Candidates for HICS Command Positions 
(Org Chart showing which hospital roles can fill command 
positions) 
 Appendix G: Stanford Code Triage Fast Action Sheets  
 Appendix H: Incident Planning Guide for Mass Casualty Incident  
 Appendix I: Incident Response Guide for Mass Casualty Incident  
 Appendix J: After Action Documentation Review 
 Appendix K: After Action Survey of HICS Implementation Model  
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APPENDIX A. STEPS OF ANALYSIS I–IV 
I. What steps did hospital leadership take to implement HICS within a 
culture of preparedness over the past five years? 
 Is there written support of HICS e.g., policy memos? 
 Did leadership participate in HICS training and exercises?  If yes, 
how often? 
 What is the allocation of financial resources to emergency 
management? 
 Does policy establish minimal HICS training requirements for staff? 
 Does the hospital operate in compliance with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS)? 
 Does the hospital operate in compliance with The Joint 
Commission emergency management standards? 
 Is the hospital compliant with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services emergency management requirements? 
 Are the principles of HICS applied more routinely than proclaimed 
emergencies (e.g., for planning a hospital picnic)? 
II. What is the extent of advanced planning with community partners that 
includes training, drills and exercises? 
 Does the hospital exceed the two Joint Commission-required 
annual exercises? 
 Do exercises include community partners?  If yes, which partners?   
 What is the frequency of training, drills and exercises over the past 
five years? Internal training, drills, exercises?  Training, drills, 
exercises with community partners? 
III. What are the components of the Hospital Command Center’s (HCC) 
Communication Plan and what are the redundancies? 
 Is the Communication Plan pre-determined? 
 Is a hard copy of the Communication Plan available in the HCC? 
 Is the Communication Plan available on the hospital’s software 
program? 
 Is there a plan if there is a power outage or lack of IT access? 
 Are hand-held radios and satellite phones available?  
 To what degree are Public Information Officers (PIO) effectively 
integrated with one another and the rest of the community system 
e.g., does the hospital participate in the county Joint Information 
Center (JIC)? 
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 What other redundancies, if any, are available i.e., low tech and/or 
high tech? 
IV. What measures, if any, were taken to modify HICS to the individual 
hospital’s needs as part of the Emergency Management Plan and as part of the 
Asiana response? 
 Have additional Incident Planning Guides (IPG) been developed? 
 Have additional Incident Response Guides (IRG) been developed? 
 Have additional potential positions been added to the HIMT 
Organization Chart? 
 Have additional HICS Forms been developed? 
 Have additional Job Action Sheets been developed? 
 Have other additional documents been developed? 
 Were any these modifications to HICS used during the Asiana 
response?  If yes, which ones? 
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APPENDIX B. HIMT ORGANIZATION CHART  
(smaller than scale) 
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APPENDIX C. HICS JOB ACTION SHEET EXAMPLE: INCIDENT 
COMMANDER JOB ACTION SHEET 
Mission: Organize and direct the Hospital Command Center (HCC). Give 
overall strategic direction for hospital incident management and support 
activities, including emergency response and recovery. Authorize total facility 
evacuation if warranted. 
 
Date:  ________  Start:  _______   End:  _______   Position Assigned to:  ____________________________  
Signature:  _________________________________________________________   Initial:  _____________  
Hospital Command Center (HCC) Location:  _____________________   Telephone:  ___________________  
Fax:  ___________________  Other Contact Info:  ________________   Radio Title:  ___________________  
 
Immediate (Operational Period 0–2 Hours) Time Initial 
Assume role of Incident Commander and activate the Hospital Incident Command 
System (HICS). 
  
Read this entire Job Action Sheet and put on position identification.   
Notify your usual supervisor and the hospital CEO, or designee, of the incident, 
activation of HICS and your HICS assignment. 
  
Initiate the Incident Briefing Form (HICS Form 201) and include the following 
information: 
 Nature of the problem (incident type, victim count, injury/illness type, etc.) 
 Safety of staff, patients and visitors 
 Risks to personnel and need for protective equipment 
 Risks to the facility 
 Need for decontamination 
 Estimated duration of incident 
 Need for modifying daily operations 
 HICS team required to manage the incident 
 Need to open up the HCC 
 Overall community response actions being taken 
 Status of local, county, and state Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) 
  
Contact hospital operator and initiate hospital’s emergency operations plan.   
Determine need for and appropriately appoint Command Staff and Section 
Chiefs, or Branch/Unit/Team leaders and Medical/Technical Specialists as 
needed; distribute corresponding Job Action Sheets and position identification. 
Assign or complete the Branch Assignment List (HICS Form 204), as appropriate.  
  
Brief all appointed staff of the nature of the problem, immediate critical issues and 
initial plan of action. Designate time for next briefing. 
  
Assign one of more clerical personnel from current staffing or make a request for 
staff to the Labor Pool and Credentialing Unit Leader, if activated, to function as the 
HCC recorder(s).  
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Immediate (Operational Period 0–2 Hours) Time Initial 
Distribute the Section Personnel Time Sheet (HICS Form 252) to Command Staff 
and Medical/Technical Specialist assigned to Command, and ensure time is 
recorded appropriately. Submit the Section Personnel Time Sheet to the 
Finance/Administration Section’s Time Unit Leader at the completion of a shift or at 
the end of each operational period.   
  
Initiate the Incident Action Plan Safety Analysis (HICS Form 261) to document 
hazards and define mitigation.   
  
Receive status reports from and develop an Incident Action Plan with Section Chiefs 
and Command Staff to determine appropriate response and recovery levels. During 
initial briefing/status reports, discover the following: 
 If applicable, receive initial facility damage survey report from Logistics 
Section Chief and evaluate the need for evacuation. 
 If applicable, obtain patient census and status from Planning Section Chief, 
and request a hospital-wide projection report for 4, 8, 12, 24 & 48 hours 
from time of incident onset. Adjust projections as necessary. 
 Identify the operational period and HCC shift change. 
 If additional beds are needed, authorize a patient prioritization assessment 
for the purposes of designating appropriate early discharge. 
 Ensure that appropriate contact with outside agencies has been established 
and facility status and resource information provided through the Liaison 
Officer. 
 Seek information from Section Chiefs regarding current “on-hand” 
resources of medical equipment, supplies, medications, food, and water as 
indicated by the incident. 
 Review security and facility surge capacity and capability plans as 
appropriate. 
  
Document all key activities, actions, and decisions in an Operational Log (HICS 
Form 214) on a continual basis. 
  
Document all communications (internal and external) on an Incident Message Form 




Intermediate (Operational Period 2–12 Hours) Time Initial 
Authorize resources as needed or requested by Command Staff.   
Designate regular briefings with Command Staff/Section Chiefs to identify and plan 
for:   
 Update of current situation/response and status of other area hospitals, 
emergency management/local emergency operation centers, and public 
health officials and other community response agencies 
 Deploying a Liaison Officer  to local EOC  
 Deploying a PIO to the local Joint Information Center 
 Critical facility and patient care issues 
 Hospital operational support issues 
 Risk communication and situation updates to staff 
 Implementation of hospital surge capacity and capability plans 
 Ensure patient tracking system established and linked with appropriate 
outside agencies and/or local EOC 
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Intermediate (Operational Period 2–12 Hours) Time Initial 
 Family Support Center operations 
 Public information, risk communication and education needs 
 Appropriate use and activation of safety practices and procedures 
 Enhanced staff protection measures as appropriate 
 Public information and education needs 
 Media relations and briefings 
 Staff and family support 
 Development, review, and/or revision of the Incident Action Plan, or 
elements of the Incident Action Plan 
Oversee and approve revision of the Incident Action Plan developed by the Planning 
Section Chief. Ensure that the approved plan is communicated to all Command Staff 
and Section Chiefs. 
  
Communicate facility and incident status and the Incident Action Plan to CEO or 




Extended (Operational Period Beyond 12 Hours) Time Initial 
Ensure staff, patient, and media briefings are being conducted regularly.   
Review and revise the Incident Action Plan Safety Analysis (HICS Form 261) and 
implement correction or mitigation strategies.   
  
Evaluate/re-evaluate need for deploying a Liaison Officer to the local EOC.   
Evaluate/re-evaluate need for deploying a PIO to the local Joint Information Center.   
Ensure incident action planning for each operational period and a reporting of the 
Incident Action Plan at each shift change and briefing.   
  
Evaluate overall hospital operational status, and ensure critical issues are 
addressed. 
  
Review /revise the Incident Action Plan with the Planning Section Chief for each 
operational period. 
  
Ensure continued communications with local, regional, and state response 
coordination centers and other HCCs through the Liaison Officer and others. 
  
Ensure your physical readiness, and that of the Command Staff and Section Chiefs, 
through proper nutrition, water intake, rest periods and relief, and stress 
management techniques. 
  
Observe all staff and volunteers for signs of stress and inappropriate behavior. 
Report concerns to the Employee Health & Well-Being Unit Leader.   
  
Upon shift change, brief your replacement on the status of all ongoing operations, 




Demobilization/System Recovery Time Initial 
Assess the plan developed by the Demobilization Unit Leader and approved by the 
Planning Section Chief for the gradual demobilization of the HCC and emergency 
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Demobilization/System Recovery Time Initial 
operations according to the progression of the incident and facility/hospital status. 
Demobilize positions in the HCC and return personnel to their normal jobs as 
appropriate until the incident is resolved and there is a return to normal operations.  
 Briefing staff, administration, and Board of Directors 
 Approve announcement of “ALL CLEAR” when incident is no longer a 
critical safety threat or can be managed using normal hospital operations 
 Ensure outside agencies are aware of status change 
 Declare hospital/facility safety 
Ensure demobilization of the HCC and restocking of supplies, as appropriate 
including: 
 Return of borrowed equipment to appropriate location 
 Replacement of broken or lost items 
 Cleaning of HCC and facility 
 Restock of HCC supplies and equipment; 
 Environmental clean-up as warranted 
  
Ensure that after-action activities are coordinated and completed including: 
 Collection of all HCC documentation by the Planning Section Chief 
 Coordination and submission of response and recovery costs, and 
reimbursement documentation by the Finance/Administration and Planning 
Section Chiefs 
 Conduct of staff debriefings to identify accomplishments, response  and 
improvement issues 
 Identify needed revisions to the Emergency Management Plan, Emergency 
Operations Plan, Job Action Sheets, operational procedures, records, 
and/or other related items 
 Writing the facility/hospital After Action Report and Improvement Plan 
 Participation in external (community and governmental) meetings and other 
post-incident discussion and after-action activities 
 Post-incident media briefings and facility/hospital status updates 
 Post-incident public education and information 




 Incident Action Plan 
 HICS Form 201 – Incident Briefing Form 
 HICS Form 204 – Branch Assignment List 
 HICS Form 207 – Incident Management Team Chart 
 HICS Form 213 – Incident Message Form 
 HICS Form 214 – Operational Log 
 HICS Form 252 – Section Personnel Time Sheet 
 HICS Form 261 – Incident Action Plan Safety Analysis 
 Hospital emergency operations plan and other plans as cited in the JAS 
 Hospital organization chart 
 Hospital telephone directory 
 Radio/satellite phone 
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APPENDIX D. STANFORD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (OEM) 
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APPENDIX E. TRANSFER OF COMMAND SHEET DEVELOPED 
BY STANFORD  
Transitioning the control and management of any disaster event from one 
Incident Commander to the next Incident Commander assuming lead 
responsibility for that event is called “transfer of command.” Transition of 
Command may be anticipated and expected in any expanding incident. Given the 
evolving nature of a significant event, the process to transition command does 
not reflect on the competency or performance of the “current” Incident 
Commander but rather on the need to assure Command role and responsibilities 
are maintained as response to the event transitions from the emergency 
response to event recovery. 
There are four important steps to assist in the effective transition of 
command for the active incident, still in progress.  
Step 1: An over-arching priority for the oncoming Incident Commander will 
be to perform an assessment of the incident situation with the existing Incident 
Commander. This is best accomplished in a “face-to-face” manner.  
Step 2: The oncoming Incident Commander must be adequately briefed 
with a thorough understanding of the event IAP and appreciation of actions taken 
to date. This briefing must be performed by the current, out-going Incident 
Commander, and is best accomplished in a “face-to-face” manner, as able.  
Step 3: After the transitional incident briefing, the oncoming Incident 
Commander should make determination as to best and appropriate time for 
transfer of command. To assure continuity in operations, physical transfer of 
command for the incident should be performed after the next established time for 
“change of shift” among the currently in place Command and General Staff 
officers. This to allow the oncoming Incident Commander the opportunity to 
phase in transition of command responsibilities while current command and 
general staff officers, with knowledge of the current status of events and IAP, are 
still on duty.   
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Step 4: At the appropriate time, formal notice of the transition in incident 
command should be made to:  
 Executive Leadership 
 Command Staff members   
 General Staff Officers 
 Incident personnel, as appropriate to the ongoing management of 
the disaster event 
Transfer of Command Briefing Checklist 
The transitional briefing between out-going and on-coming IC must cover 
a review of the following:  
 Incident History (what has happened): 
 HICS-201 Incident Briefing 
 Incident Organization 
 HICS-203 Organization Assignment List 
 HICS-207 Organizational Chart 
 Priorities and Objectives 
 HICS-202 Incident Objectives List  
 Demobilization Plan  
 Daily Meeting Schedule  
 Significant outstanding issues or priorities 
 Meeting Summary  
 HICS 251, 261, Safety status of the event to date 
 Significant outstanding issues or priorities 
 Current Plan 
 HICS-202 Incident Objectives List 
 Resources Ordered/Needed (personnel/materials) 
 Critical resources ordered awaiting completion 
 Facilities Established (related to response) 
 Status of Communications 
 Any Constraints or Limitations 
 Incident Potential 
 Issues involving risk and liability to facility or operations 
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 Delegation of Authority 
 HICS-207 Organizational Chart 
 Communication of Transfer of Command 
 Executive Leadership 
 Command Staff members 
 General Staff Officers 
 Incident Personnel, as appropriate  
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APPENDIX F. POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR HICS COMMAND 
POSITIONS (ORG CHART SHOWING WHICH HOSPITAL ROLES 
CAN FILL COMMAND POSITIONS)  
Purpose: The “Potential Candidates for HICS Positions” crosswalk (next page) 
provides suggestions for administrative positions commonly found in hospitals 
and their potential assigned roles in the Hospital Command Center (HCC), when 
activated. These suggestions are based on similarity to day-to-day position roles 
during the activation of the assigned role during operation of the HCC.  
 
Use: The crosswalk is intended for pre-event planning and assignment of 
Hospital Command Center roles. By pre-assigning HCC assignments, the staff 
can be educated and exercised on their duties and scope of responsibility during 
an activation, and will be familiar with the associated Job Action Sheet before the 
event. It is recommended that each HCC Command position have not less than 




















 Hospital Administrator/Administrator On-Call 
 Nursing Supervisor 
 Chief Executive Officer 
 Chief Operating Officer 
 Chief Medical Officer 
 Chief Nursing Officer 
 Emergency Management  Coordinator 
 Safety Director 
 Security Chief 
 Building Engineer 
 Emergency Management 
Coordinator 
 Radiation Safety Officer 
 Employee Health 
 Infection Control 
 Risk Management 
 Industrial Hygienist 
 Industrial Hygienist 
 Infectious Disease 
Specialist 
 Infection Control 
 Epidemiology 
 Chief of Staff 
 Chief of Pediatrics 
 Radiation Safety Officer 
 Nuclear Medicine 
 Health Physicist 
 Structural Engineer 
 Outpatient Services Administrator 
 Chief of Trauma 
 Primary Care Director 
 Behavior Health Director 
 Legal 
 Risk Manager 
 Poison Control Director 
 IT/IS Director 
 Hospital Public Information Officer 
 Marketing Director 
 Patient Relations 
 Risk Management 
 Chief Information Officer 
 Community Relations 
 Chief Executive Officer 
 Emergency Management 
Coordinator 
 Chief Operating Officer 
 Chief Medical Officer 
 Chief Nursing Officer 
 Nursing Supervisor 
 Emergency Management Coordinator 
 Strategic Planning 
 VP of Administration 
 Human Resources Director 
 Nursing Director 
 Chief Nursing Officer 
 Nursing Supervisor 
 VP of Facilities 
 Emergency Management 
Coordinator 
 Chief Procurement Officer 
 Support Services Director 
 Supply Director 
 Chief Operating Officer 
 Facilities Director 
 Warehouse Director 
 Chief Finance Officer 
 VP of Finance 
 VP of Business Services 
 VP of Administration 
 Controller/Comptroller 
 Chief Information Officer 
 Hospital Administrator/ 
Admintrator on Call 
 Safety Director 
 Chief Engineer 
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APPENDIX H. INCIDENT PLANNING GUIDE FOR MASS 
CASUALTY INCIDENT  
A. DEFINITION 
This Incident Planning Guide is intended to address issues associated with a 
mass casualty incident and subsequent patient surge, regardless of the 
precipitating event, that taxes a hospital’s ability to provide care to all patients. 
Mass casualty incidents can come from many situations, such as transit 
incidents, mass gatherings, building collapse, and others. Hospitals may 
customize this Incident Planning Guide for their specific requirements. 
B. SCENARIO 
Late one afternoon, breaking news on the waiting room television shows reports 
of a bridge collapse over a nearby river as rush hour begins. Secondary fires 
have erupted and there are victims in the river. Your hospital is the closest to the 
incident. 911 dispatch notifies area emergency departments of the mass casualty 
incident and projects greater than 100 victims. The county Emergency 
Operations Center is activated. Your hospital’s emergency department is at 90% 
capacity and is holding 16 inpatients waiting for beds. Several victims have 
begun to self-present on foot with minor injuries. In addition to casualties, you 
can anticipate a media onslaught, high telephone volume from families looking 
for relatives, licensed and non-licensed volunteers, and behavioral health 
counseling needs for patients, families, and staff. 
 
Does your Emergency Management Program address the following issues? 
Mitigation  
1. 
Does your hospital address the threat and impact of a mass casualty incident 
in the annual Hazard Vulnerability Analysis, including the identification of 
mitigation strategies and tactics? 
2. 
Does your hospital participate in pre-incident local response planning with 
public safety officials (e.g., emergency medical services, fire, and law 
enforcement), local emergency management officials, other area hospitals, 
regional healthcare coalition coordinators , and other appropriate public and 




Does your hospital include mitigation strategies to reduce the risk from a 
mass casualty incident in your emergency management program?  
4. 
Does your hospital have agreements with other hospitals to share resources 
and information?  
5. 
Does your hospital have established mechanisms with emergency medical 
services to distribute patients to appropriate hospitals within the area to 
avoid overwhelming individual hospitals?  
Preparedness 
1. 
Does your hospital have a Mass Casualty Incident Plan that includes:  
 A procedure for canceling elective surgeries, procedures, and outpatient 
appointments?  
 A procedure for rapid patient registration? 
 A procedure to track and identify patients?  
 A procedure to facilitate patient discharge from the emergency 
department? 
 A system to quickly move patients waiting to be admitted out of the 
emergency department?  
 A procedure to utilize alternate treatment areas within your hospital for 
overflow victims? 
 A procedure to facilitate early discharges and transfers out of your 
hospital? 
 A system to obtain current bed status, availability, and a census of 
patients waiting to be admitted?  
 A procedure to alert relevant staff (emergency department, critical care, 
surgery, radiology, blood bank, etc.) that will need to be called in?  
 A mechanism for providing staff with information including notifying them 
when adequate staff have reported to your hospital? 
 
 A procedure to evaluate and activate emergency department diversion 
status?  
 A procedure to enforce patient discharge times and a holding area for 
discharged patients to wait until transportation arrives? 
 A plan for a staffed observation area for pediatric or other patients that 
have completed medical care but cannot be discharged?  
 Agreements with healthcare partners to provide nonessential services to 
patients? 
 A procedure to establish a family waiting area or reunification area? 
 A procedure to effectively manage special needs populations (i.e., deaf, 
blind, behavioral health, pediatric, and bariatric)? 
 A procedure to establish a media area?  
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2. 
Does your hospital exercise the Mass Casualty Incident Plan yearly and 
revise it as needed? 
3. 
Does your hospital have a plan for prioritizing essential patient care, 
resources, and triggers for implementing crisis standards of care? 
4. 
Does your hospital have a trigger and a process to change documentation 
and ordering of clinical studies during a mass casualty incident? 
5. 
Does your hospital have a plan to increase emergency department capacity 
(e.g., doubling rooms, medical gas outlets, point-of-care testing)? 
6. 
Does your hospital have a process for secondary triage of patients for 
resources such as computed tomography (CT scan) or operating room (OR) 
availability? 
7. 
Does your hospital have a plan to supplement staffing, including use of 
registry nurses and other licensed healthcare professionals? 
8. 
Does your hospital have a Volunteer Utilization Plan for the use of solicited 
and unsolicited volunteers that includes verification of licensure and 
certification?  
9. 
Does your hospital have a plan to quickly deploy staff, supplies, equipment, 
and medications for a mass casualty incident?  
10. 
Does your hospital have a plan to contact medical staff to support 
emergency department physicians (e.g., hospitalists, intensivists, 
surgeons)? 
11. 
Does your hospital have a procedure for requesting resources and 
assistance from the local emergency medical services? 
12. 
Does your hospital have plans to supplement supplies, equipment, and 
medications for long-term operations with community-wide, regional, state, 
or national impact?  
13. 
Does your hospital have a plan to provide employee food, water, and rest 
areas throughout a prolonged incident?  
14. 
Does your hospital’s Business Continuity Plan include a line of succession 
when administrative staff are unavailable? 
15. 
Does your hospital have a plan to provide dependent care for staff to 
encourage them to report for duty? 
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16. 
Does your hospital have a process to provide accurate and continuous 
incident documentation, computerized or manual, that includes: 
 Patient care? 
 Incident management (Incident Action Plan, Hospital Incident Command 
System forms, etc.)? 
 Incident related expenses? 
17. 
Does your Mass Casualty Incident Plan address communications including: 
 Pre-incident standard messages for communicating the risks associated 
with this incident and recommendations to the public and media? 
 Participation in the Joint Information System or Joint Information Center 
in cooperation with local, regional, or state emergency management 
partners? 
 Use of social media for communication, including: 
o Who can use social media? 
o Who approves the use of social media? 
o When is use of social media not appropriate? 
 Procedures for notification of internal and external authorities (local, 
county, region, state)? 
 A plan to distribute radios, auxiliary phones, and flashlights to 
appropriate people and areas? 
 A plan for rapid communication of weather status (watch, warning)? 
 A plan for rapid communication of the situation to local emergency 
management and area hospitals? 
 A process to identify patients and to notify family members? 
Immediate and Intermediate Response 
1. 
Does your hospital have a Triage Plan that includes: 
 Criteria for when to institute triage?  
 Designated areas for each victim type? 
 Procedures for mass traumatic injury? 
 Procedures for biological agent exposure or contamination or both?  
 Procedures for screening infectious patients?  
 Procedures for chemical exposure or contamination or both?  
 Procedures for radiation exposure or contamination or both?  
 Segregation of exposed versus contaminated patients? 
 Behavioral health services for anxious or asymptomatic patients?  
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2. 
Does the Mass Casualty Incident Plan include: 
 Procedures to obtain additional medical support? 
 Procedures to hold or cancel pending surgeries and outpatient 
procedures? 
 Determination of “fitness for duty” (temperature checks, symptom 
review, etc.)? 
3. 
Does your hospital have a Fatality Management Plan that addresses: 
 Integration with local or state Medical Examiner or Coroner? 
 Preservation of evidence and chain of custody?  
 Religious and cultural concerns? 
 Management of contaminated decedents? 
 Family notification procedures? 
 Behavioral health support for family and staff? 
 Documentation? 
4. 
Does your hospital have a process to facilitate rapid discharge of patients to 
home or alternate sites? 
5.  
Does your hospital have a process to track patients who are transferred to 
other facilities?  
6. 
Does your hospital have a process to notify family members when patients 
are moved to other facilities?  
7. 
Does your hospital have a plan to regularly communicate with patients, 
staff, and families about the hospital’s status?  
8. 
Does your hospital have the ability to expedite the cleaning of patient care 
areas?  
9. 
Does your hospital have an Alternate Care Site Plan that includes: 
 Criteria and rapid decision making processes for determining the need to 
activate?  
 Provision of appropriate supplies, equipment, and staffing? 
 Provision of adequate communications and information technology 
capability once established? 
 Notification of local emergency medical services of location, type, and 




Does your hospital have a Volunteer Utilization Plan that includes:  
 Verification of license and identification?  
 Providing orientation to the facility and work area, including safety and 
infection control? 
 Confidentiality agreement? 
 Chain of command or supervision? 
 Assignment of duties? 
 Communication? 
 Documentation? 
Extended Response and System Recovery 
1. 
Does your hospital have a process to determine the need for canceling 
elective procedures and surgeries and other nonessential services (e.g., gift 
shop) and activities (e.g., conferences, meetings)? 
2. 
Does your hospital have a process to reschedule canceled surgeries, 
procedures, and services in a timely but graduated manner? 
3. 
Does your hospital have a plan and procedures to ensure continuation of 
patient care services?  
4. 
Does your hospital have a continuing process to capture all costs and 
expenditures related to operations?  
5. 
Does your hospital have a Demobilization Plan that includes criteria for 
deactivation of positions, reactivation of services, and the return to normal 
operations?  
6. 
Does your hospital have a plan to provide behavioral health support and 
stress management debriefings to patients, staff, and families, including 
obtaining services of local or regional resources?  
7. 
Does your hospital have procedures for reporting and documenting staff 
exposures and injuries?  
8. 
Does your hospital have Hospital Incident Management Team position 
depth to support extended operations?  
9. Does your hospital’s Business Continuity Plan address long term events?  
10. 
Does your hospital have procedures to collect and collate incident 
documentation and formulate an After Action Report and Corrective Action 
and Improvement Plan?  
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APPENDIX I. INCIDENT RESPONSE GUIDE FOR MASS 
CASUALTY INCIDENT  
A. MISSION 
To ensure a safe environment for staff, patients, visitors, and the facility when the 
number of patients severely challenges or exceeds the capability and capacity of 
the hospital. 
B. DIRECTIONS 
Read this entire response guide and review the Hospital Incident Management 
Team Activation chart. Use this response guide as a checklist to ensure all tasks 
are addressed and completed. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
 Identify, triage, and treat patients 
 Provide safe and appropriate patient care, based on scope of response 
 Maintain patient tracking 
 Provide continuity of care for non-incident patients 
 Maintain communications with healthcare and public safety response partners 
 
Immediate Response (0–2 hours) 




 Activate Emergency 
Operations Plan, Mass 
Casualty Incident Plan, 
Hospital Incident 
Management Team, and 
Hospital Command Center. 
 
 Establish operational periods, 
objectives, and regular 
briefing schedule. Consider 
use of Incident Action Plan 
Quick Start for initial 
documentation of the 
incident. 
 
 Notify hospital Chief 
Executive Officer, Board of 
Directors, and other 
appropriate internal and 
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Immediate Response (0–2 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 





 Conduct media briefings and 
situation updates, in 
conjunction with Incident 
Commander. 
 
 Maintain communication with 
patients, staff, and families 
regarding current situation 
and what’s being done to 
address the situation. 
 
 Monitor media outlets for 
updates on the incident and 
possible impacts on the 
hospital. Communicate 
information via regular 
briefings to Section Chiefs 
and Incident Commander. 
 
Liaison Officer 
 Notify community partners in 
accordance with local policies 
and procedures (e.g., 
consider local Emergency 
Operations Center, other 
area healthcare facilities, 
local emergency medical 
services, and healthcare 
coalition coordinator), to 
determine incident details, 
community status, estimates 
of casualties, and establish 
contacts for requesting 
supplies, equipment, or 
personnel not available in the 
facility. 
 
 Communicate with local 
emergency medical services 
for local, regional, and state 
bed availability. 
 
Safety Officer  Complete HICS 215A to  
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Immediate Response (0–2 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
assign, direct, and ensure 
safety actions are adhered to 
and completed. 
 If nontraditional areas are 
used for patient care and 
other services, ensure they 





 Direct implementation of 
safety practices (e.g., sharps 
disposal, linen control, trash 
control, biohazard materials 
control, electrical safety, 











 Review hospital census and 
determine if patient 
discharges and appointment 
cancellations are required. 
 
 Establish a staffing plan for 
medical direction and nursing 
care in alternate care sites or 
nontraditional patient care 
areas. 
 
 Identify inpatients for 
immediate discharge or 
transfer to other facilities and 
direct staff to expedite patient 
discharges. 
 
 Establish a patient discharge 
area to free beds until 
patients can be discharged or 
transferred and transported. 
 
 Provide for the rapid clearing 
and turnover of patient care 
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Immediate Response (0–2 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
beds and areas to expedite 
patient discharge and 
admission. 
 Consider extending 




 Consider cancellation of all 
planned surgeries and 
outpatient procedures. 
 
 Prepare for fatalities in 
conjunction with Medical 
Examiner or Coroner and 






 Consider use of facility 
lockdown to restrict access.  
 
 Consider establishing 
alternate traffic routing to 
facilitate triage and arrival of 
multiple victims. 
 
Planning Section Chief 
 Assess, in collaboration with 
Operations Section, current 
staffing and project staffing 
needs or shortages for the 
next operational period. 
 
 Establish operational periods, 
incident objectives, and the 
Incident Action Plan in 
collaboration with Incident 
Commander.  
 
 In conjunction with 
Operations Section, review 
all surgeries, outpatient 
appointments, and 
procedures for cancellation or 
rescheduling, and make 
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Immediate Response (0–2 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 




 Initiate personnel and 
materiel tracking. 
 
Situation Unit  
Leader 
 Initiate patient and bed 
tracking in collaboration with 




 Gather situational 
assessment and response 
data from internal and 
external sources. 
 
 Collect and collate patient, 
bed, personnel, and materiel 
tracking status and project 




 Coordinate with Planning and 
Operations Sections to 
determine, obtain, and 
transport additional supplies, 
equipment, medications, and 





 Establish Labor Pool and 
Credentialing Unit if needed. 
 
 Register, credential, assign, 
and mobilize solicited and 
unsolicited volunteers per 
Volunteer Utilization Plan. 
 
 Assist the Operations Section 
with establishing alternate 








Intermediate Response (2–12 hours) 




 Update hospital Chief 
Executive Officer, Board 
of Directors, and other 
appropriate internal and 
external officials of 
situation status. 
 
 Monitor and ensure that 
communications and 
decision-making are 
coordinated with external 
agencies and healthcare 
facilities, as appropriate. 
 
 Establish a schedule to 
regularly update and 
revise the initial Incident 
Action Plan, in 






 Continue to provide 
information to patients, 
staff, visitors, families, 
and media regarding 
situation status and 
facility measures taken to 
meet demand.  
 
 Coordinate information 




 Continue to communicate 
with local emergency 
medical services 
regarding local, regional, 
and state bed availability 
and updating on hospital 
situation status and 
critical issues or needs. 
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Intermediate Response (2–12 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
Safety Officer 
 Continue to implement 
and maintain safety and 
personal protective 
measures to protect 
patients, staff, visitors, 




 Refer to Job Action Sheet 





 Continue patient care and 
management activities.  
 Provide re-triage and 
observation of all 
patients waiting for 
further care 
 Provide crisis 





with Planning Section) 
 









 Establish a family 
reunification area and 
provide support staff to 
facilitate the flow of 
information. 
 
 Consider activating a 
patient information center. 
 
Planning Section Chief 
 Update and revise the 
Incident Action Plan, and 
distribute to Command 
Staff and Section Chiefs. 
 
 Coordinate with 
Operations Section for 
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Intermediate Response (2–12 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
continued consideration 
of canceling or 
rescheduling surgeries 
and elective procedures. 
Resources Unit 
Leader 
















 Refer to Job Action Sheet 





 Continue to call in 




 Coordinate the 
transportation services 
(ambulance, air medical 
services, and other 
transportation) with the 
Operations Section 
(Medical Care Branch) to 
ensure safe patient 
relocation, if necessary. 
 
 Obtain needed supplies, 
equipment, and 
medications to support 
patient care activities. 
 
 Establish an employee 
dependent care area, as 
appropriate. 
 
 Rapidly investigate and 
document injuries or 




Finance/ Section Chief  Implement procedures to  
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Intermediate Response (2–12 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
Administration authorize expedited 
procurement of emergent 
supplies, equipment, and 
medications to meet 
patient care and facility 
needs. 
 Track all costs and 
expenditures of response 
and estimate lost 
revenues due to canceled 
procedures and surgeries 
and other services. 
 
Time Unit  
Leader 
 Track hours associated 




Extended Response (greater than 12 hours) 




 Establish priorities for 
restoring normal operations 






 Conduct briefings for 
media, in cooperation with 
the Joint Information 
Center. 
 
 Address social media 
issues as warranted; use 
social media for messaging 
as situation dictates.  
 
Liaison Officer 
 Communicate facility 
status, report of patient 




Operations Section Chief 
 Refer to Job Action Sheet 







 Review current patient 
census, capability to 
continue services, and 
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Extended Response (greater than 12 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
timeframe to return to 







 Provide behavioral health 
support and community 
services information for 
patients and families. 
 
Section Chief 
 Ensure that updated 
information and intelligence 
is incorporated into the 
Incident Action Plan. 
Ensure the Demobilization 






 Collect, organize, secure, 




 Refer to Job Action Sheet 








 Monitor health status of 
staff, and provide 
appropriate medical and 






 Collect unused supplies 
distributed to alternate care 
and non-traditional care 
sites. Restock and 
redistribute all supplies and 
medications. 
 
 Continue to track all costs 
and expenditures of 
response and estimate lost 
revenues due to canceled 
procedures and surgeries 





 Continue to track hours 




Extended Response (greater than 12 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
 
   
Demobilization/System Recovery 










 Conduct final briefings for 
media, in cooperation with 
the Joint Information 
Center. 
 
 Close the patient 




 Communicate facility status, 
final report of patient 
condition and location to 





 Refer to Job Action Sheet 





 Deactivate alternate care 
sites and nontraditional 
patient care areas and 
safely close. 
 
 Reschedule canceled 
surgeries, procedures, and 
outpatient appointments. 
 
 Repatriate transferred 






 If record keeping included 
use of paper-based records, 
ensure all clinical 
information is entered into 
electronic medical records. 
 
Planning Section Chief 




Extended Response (greater than 12 hours) 
Section Officer Time Action Initials 
 Conduct debriefings and 
hotwash with: 
 Command Staff and 
section personnel 
 Administrative personnel 
 All staff 
 All volunteers 
 
 Write an After Action Report 
and Corrective Action and 
Improvement Plan that 
includes: 
 Summary of the incident 
 Summary of actions 
taken 
 Actions that went well 
 Actions that could be 
improved 
 Recommendations for 




 Collect, organize, secure, 
and file incident 
documentation. 
 
 Prepare summary of the 
status and location of all 
incident patients, staff, and 
equipment. After approval 
by Incident Commander, 
distribute to appropriate 
external agencies. 
 
Logistics Section Chief 
 Inventory all Hospital 
Command Center and 
hospital supplies and 
replenish as necessary, 





 Compile summary of final 
response and recovery cost 
and expenditures, and 
estimated lost revenues. 
 
 
Documents and Tools 
 125 
Documents and Tools 
Emergency Operations Plan, including: 
 Mass Casualty Incident Plan 
 Triage Plan 
 Patient, staff, and equipment tracking procedures 
 Business Continuity Plan 
 Behavioral Health Support Plan 
 Alternate Care Site Plan 
 Security Plan 
 Lockdown Plan 
 Fatality Management Plan 
 Volunteer Utilization Plan 
 Emergency Patient Registration Plan 
 Risk Communication Plan 
 Demobilization Plan 
Forms, including: 
 HICS Incident Action Plan (IAP) Quick Start  
 HICS 200 – Incident Action Plan (IAP) Cover Sheet 
 HICS 201 – Incident Briefing 
 HICS 202 – Incident Objectives 
 HICS 203 – Organization Assignment List  
 HICS 205A – Communications List 
 HICS 214 – Activity Log 
 HICS 215A – Incident Action Plan (IAP) Safety Analysis 
 HICS 221 – Demobilization Check-Out 
 HICS 251 – Facility System Status Report 
 HICS 253 – Volunteer Registration 
 HICS 254 – Disaster Victim/Patient Tracking 
 HICS 255 – Master Patient Evacuation Tracking 
Job Action Sheets 
Access to hospital organization chart 
Television/radio/Internet to monitor news 
Telephone/cell phone/satellite phone/Internet/amateur radio/2-way radio for 
communication 
D. HOSPITAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM ACTIVATION: MASS 
CASUALTY INCIDENT 
Position Immediate Intermediate Extended Recovery 
Incident Commander X X X X 
Public Information Officer X X X X 
Liaison Officer X X X X 
Safety Officer X X X X 
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Position Immediate Intermediate Extended Recovery 
 
Operations Section Chief X X X X 
Medical Care Branch 
Director 
X X X X 
Security Branch Director X X X X 
Business Continuity Branch 
Director 
   X 
Patient Family Assistance 
Branch Dir. 
 X X X 
 
Planning Section Chief X X X X 
Resources Unit Leader X X X X 
Situation Unit Leader X X X X 
Documentation Unit Leader   X X 
Demobilization Unit Leader  X X X 
 
Logistics Section Chief X X X X 




 X X X 
Time Unit Leader  X X X 
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APPENDIX J. AFTER ACTION DOCUMENTATION REVIEW 
The After Action Report is one component of a large confidential binder securely 
locked that was reviewed on October 28 and 29, 2014 and March 10, 2015 at 
Stanford’s OEM.   
The large binder is entitled “SFO Commercial Aircraft, Incident Response, July 6, 
2013, Stanford Hospital and Clinics, Lucille Packard Children’s Hospital” 
The binder is organized by five major tabs:  
1. HCC Sign-in and Incident Action Plan;  
2. HICS Job Action Sheets (JAS), HICS 214s (Unit Logs) and Notes;  
3. Department Damage Reports;  
4. Debrief Info;  
5. After Action Report (AAR) and Timeline of Events 
1st tab: HCC Sign-in and IAP:   
The following HICS forms were used: 
The HICS 252, Section Personnel Time Sheet was initiated at 1:15 on July 6th. 
The Incident Commander was the Chief Operating Officer. This form is 
completed throughout activation.191 
The HICS 201, Incident Briefing, the HIMT chart was filled for Command and 
General Staff (the Section Chiefs). This form is completed prior to the briefing in 
the Operational Period.192 
The 1st briefing was at 2:09 pm, 5 total admissions at this point, the Operating 
Room was ready to go, the bed availability was 16 in the Intensive Care Unit 
(ICU), 22 in Intermediate ICU, 26+ medical surgical beds; at 3:00 the hospital 
was still awaiting 41–74 “minor” patients estimated to arrive (the actual number 
that later arrived was much smaller). 
 
                                            
191 California EMSA, The HICS Guidebook, 2006. Page 403. 
192 Ibid. 
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The HICS 202 Incident Objectives:193 
1. Confirm staffing/competencies 
2. Confirm capacity 
3. Confirm inbound 
4. Complete standing up HCC 
At 6:40 pm the Red Cross Family Unification Number was provided. 
The HICS 203 Organization and Assignment List. This form is completed at the 
start of the first Operational Period, prior to each subsequent Operational Period, 
and as additional positions are staffed.194 
The HICS 204 Branch Assignment List. This is completed at the start of each 
Operational Period.195 
The HICS 207 HIMT Organization Chart. Positions filled were all Command 
positions (Incident Commander, Public Information Officer, Liaison Officer, Safety 
Officer and 2 Medical Technical Specialists), General Staff positions (Operations 
Section Chief, Planning Section Chief, Logistics Section Chief, and 
Finance/Administration Chief) and the Medical Care Branch Director and Security 
Branch Director under the Operations Section; and the Documentation Unit 
Leader under the Planning Section. This form is completed at the start of each 
Operational Period and as changes are made.196 
2nd tab: HICS Job Action Sheets (JAS), HICS 214s and notes: 
Job Action Sheets were observed and reviewed for the Incident Commander, the 
Operations Section Chiefs and the Planning Section Chief (three positions 
altogether) for the Immediate Operational Period of 0–2 hours and the 
Intermediate Operational Period of 2–12 hours 
The HICS 214a Operational Log was completed by the Planning Chief and 
Operations Chief and Security Branch Director. This form is completed 
                                            
193 Ibid. This form was renamed the Incident Action Plan or IAP with the Fifth Edition of HICS 





continuously as a tool used to record critical details and major decisions at all 
levels from activation through demobilization.197 
The Scribe Minutes Log was also reviewed. This is a log Stanford developed.  
3rd tab Department Damage Report 
All departments reported they were adequately staffed, four departments recalled 
staff from home. 
4th tab Debrief information and Data Collection sheets/Emails 
A total of 125 staff participated in three different After Action/debrief meetings 
between 7–8 and 8–4-13. 
7-8-13 Mass Casualty Triage Debrief, 15 staff signed in to participate 
7-9-13 SFO Plane Crash/Code Triage Debrief, 78 staff signed in to participate  
8-4-13 MCI AAR Debrief ED/Trauma, 32 staff signed in to participate 
Twenty-six (26) data collection forms and 23 emails were reviewed with the focus 
of identifying comments, positive or negative, relative to HICS. Comments not 
directly related to HICS are not considered relevant. 
No positive comments directly related to HICS on the Data Collection Forms and 
Emails: 
Though there were dozens of positive comments that related to individual and 
team performance and the efficiency of the HCC, the data collection forms and 
emails did not contain positive comments that were directly related to HICS.   
Two negative comments directly related to HICS on the Data Collection Forms 
and Emails: 
“The HICS Job Action Plans are not as clear as they could be and appear more 
complex than necessary. There is also no Job Action Plan for a mass casualty 
event!” These two negative comments were written by one person. 
5th tab After Action Report (AAR) and Timeline of Events 
Much of the information previously presented in the summary of Stanford’s 
response was taken from the AAR which reviews the performance of the Joint 
                                            
197 Ibid. Page 404. 
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Commission’s six Critical Elements of Emergency Management; Communication, 
Resources and Assets, Staff Responsibilities, Utilities Management, and Patient 
Clinical and Support Activities.198  
One positive comment directly related to HICS in the AAR: 
One observation under the Communication element on the AAR was a strength 
directly related to HICS: 
“Information traveled through appropriate HICS channels, both in terms of going 
up to the HCC and back down. The established HICS processes and procedures 
worked.”199 
No negative comments directly related to HICS in the AAR:  
The AAR did not contain negative comments directly relevant to HICS.  
                                            
198 Stanford Hospitals and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital 2013 SFO Plane 
Crash Mass Casualty Incident After Action Report/Improvement Plan, For Official Use Only. Page 
11. 
199 Ibid. Page 12. 
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APPENDIX K. AFTER ACTION SURVEY OF HICS IMPLEMENTATION MODEL  
A. Implementation  
1. Executive/Administrative Support 
 
-Executive leadership supports HICS implementation 
 
-Executives participate in HICS activations 
 
-the budget devoted to emergency preparedness is sufficient 
 
2. Planning and Tailoring 
-an Emergency Program Coordinator position is  
allocated 
 
- HICS Policies and Procedures are implemented 
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-HICS is modified as needed to meet the hospital’s needs 
 
3. Training and Retraining 
 
-Staff are trained in Command and General Staff positions 
 
- Retraining is provided in 2 year intervals 
 
4. HICS Activations and Exercises 
-HICS is activated twice yearly 
 
-HICS is activated at least four times yearly 
 
5. Communication 
-the plan for internal communication is sufficient and 
redundant (a backup for the backup) 
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-the plan for external communication is sufficient and 
redundant 
 
6. Coordination with External/Community Partners 
-Coordination with External/Community Partners such as 
fire, law, EMS, emergency services is sufficient such that 
hospital preparedness and response is integrated 
 
B. Successful Response 
1. The use of HICS assisted the hospital in a successful response.  
 
Comments:   
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